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Your toys have gone berserk 
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INTRODUCTION 
The dissertation is a defense of the following conditional claim: if there are 
objective collapses of the wavefunction, then the future is genuinely open. 
Although this is no radically new idea, the strategy I shall use to defend it is 
a new one. It proceeds in two main steps. First, building upon the recent 
literature on metaphysical indeterminacy in quantum mechanics, I argue 
for the view that systems in superposition have be interpreted as objectively 
indeterminate state of aﬀairs. Second, I propose an alternative way to think 
of openness, according to which the future is open as of  t,  if and only 
if there is an indeterminate state of aﬀair S at t, and S becomes determinate 
at  t’  (with  t’  later than t). To argue for the second step, I will give an 
analysis  of the objective collapses of the wavefunction as the becoming 
determinate of previously indeterminate systems.  Furthermore, in 
developing my arguments, I will also make some remarks concerning the 
ontology of objective collapse interpretations of  quantum mechanics, the 
issue of whether metaphysical indeterminacy can be at some derivate level 
of  reality, and the possibility of the openness of the future being an 
emergent phenomenon. 
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We are often told that modern physics favors a B Theoretic conception of 
time . The main reason for this, is that Relativity implies that it is 1
impossible to specify a preferred frame of reference. This, in turn, makes 
the notion of absolute simultaneity between any pair of events, as needed by 
the A Theory, straightforwardly inconsistent . However, we know that 2
Relativity is not the whole story. Last century’s physics gave us another 
amazingly well-confirmed theory, Quantum Mechanics (henceforth, QM), 
and arguably, the two theories cannot both be true at the same time. Thus, 
some philosophers have found vindication for some A Theoretic 
conceptions of time in certain features of QM (Popper 1982, Shimony 1993, 
Lucas 1998, Christian 2001, inter alia).  
 As to the how they have done so, we can broadly distinguish two     
diﬀerent lines of reasoning.  
(1) Non-Locality — It has been argued (Popper 1982, Shimony 1993, 
Lucas 1998) that non-local interactions between space-like 
separated systems, by occurring instantaneously, and in a frame 
 The labels ‘A’/‘B Theories’ have been introduced by Richard Gale in that anthology The 1
Philosophy of Time (1967), where he analyses the famous argument for the unreality of 
time made by John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart (1908). Roughly, the A Theory of time 
maintains that the properties of ‘being past’, ‘being present’, and ‘being future’ (the so-
called A-properties) are irreducible features of reality, whereas the B Theory claims that 
those properties can be fully explained in terms of B-relations such as ‘later’ and ‘earlier’. 
For an overview, see: Le Poidevin (1998), and Maudlin (2007, ch. 4). 
 Although the incompatibility between A Theory and Relativity was rather acknowledged 2
from the very first formulation of the theory, the firsts who explicitly formulated the 
objection are Putnam (1967), and Stein (1968). Others who followed this line of reasoning 
include: Savitt (1994), Sider (2001), Wüthrich (2013). There are, of course, many replies to 
the objection: Craig (2001), Markosian (2004), Zimmerman (2011), inter alia. For a 
general overview on this topic, see: Saunders (2002). It is worth noticing though, that in its 
first formulation also the B Theory would be incompatible with relativistic theories. The 
crucial diﬀerence between the two, in fact, is that the B Theory can relativize ‘earlier’ and 
‘later’ relations to frame of reference without changing the spirit of the view. It is highly 
controversial that any such move can be made by the A theorist.
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independent way, force to the reintroduction of a preferred 
foliation of space-time, thus providing a notion of absolute 
simultaneity as it is needed to formulate the A Theory .  3
(2) Collapse of the Wavefunction — Some physicists and 
philosophers (Stapp 1977, Whitrow 1980, Christian 2001, Lucas 
1999, Gisin 2016) have argued that objective collapse 
interpretations of QM, such as the well-known Ghirardi Rimini & 
Weber approach (GRW in short, 1986), if true, would support the 
view that time genuinely passes, and that the future is open not 
only from an epistemic perspective.   
To be clear, notice that (2) can be taken as independent from the A/B 
Theory distinction, as I will show more clearly in the fourth chapter.  
 In his recent book What Makes Time Special?, among many other things,     
Craig Callender (2017) has spent a tremendous eﬀort to show why both 
options above need be rejected . While I will leave the discussion about (1) 4
to another occasion, this dissertation is, in a way, an extensive response to 
Callender’s arguments against (2). So, before getting started, it will be useful 
to have a look at his view on these issues.  
 The core claim behind (2) might be expressed by the following     
conditional: 
 Here is Popper (1982), for instance, arguing from non-locality to a Lorentzian 3
interpretation of Relativity: « If there is action at a distance, then there is something like 
absolute space. If we now have theoretical reasons from quantum theory for introducing 
absolute simultaneity, then we would have to go back to Lorentz’s interpretation ». For an 
insightful and updated discussion, see Baron (2017).
 The chapter from Callender’s book I am commenting here is a reprinted version of a 4
previous paper from (2008). Although there are some few diﬀerences between the two, I 
will use both versions almost interchangeably. 
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Quantum Open Future (QOF) — If there are objective collapses of the 
wavefunction (as described by GRW and the likes), then the future 
is open in a genuine, not only epistemic sense.  
In the face of QOF, the opponent of the open future thesis can simply reject 
objective collapse interpretations altogether. For instance, she could appeal 
to the fact that (as argued in Albert (1992), inter alia) it is not yet clear 
whether they solve the measurement problem. Though attractive for 
whomever is unsatisfied by this particular interpretation of QM, this move 
is philosophically of little or no interest. First of, because it does not seem 
acceptable (at least to many of us) to reject a physical theory in order to 
defend a metaphysical view (no matter how plausible the view is). And 
secondly, to those who are not moved by such general considerations, I can 
simply suggest they take QOF as an interesting thesis per se, thus simply 
conditionalising on the truth of GRW type of interpretation.  
 Instead of arguing directly against the antecedent, Callender aims at     
denying that QOF expresses a true entailment, and he does so by 
considering, and eventually rejecting, three ways in which the entailment 
could be justified. First, Callender notices that the connection between 
collapse theories and the open future could be found in the role played by 
objective probabilities in QM.  
Perhaps the link with openness and transience arises instead from the 
single-case objective probabilities needed for a collapse theory? Shimony 
and Popper stress throughout their work the benefits of a truly probabilistic 
process, seeing in it an open future, the flow of time, and even freedom. The 
intuitions underlying these links are clear enough. Suppose at time t there is 
an objective chance of 0.5 that a radium atom will decay tomorrow. For this 
to be true, some believe, there must not ‘‘already’’ at t be a unique 
determinate future with (say) a decayed radium atom in it tomorrow. That 
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would entail, in one way of understanding objective chances, an objective 
probability of 1, not 0.5. Since the tenseless theory of time entails that there 
is a unique determinate future – in a sense – the existence of non-trivial 
objective probabilities requires the tensed theory of time. (2008, p. 69) 
Although this view could take diﬀerent forms, the core idea is that a 
satisfactory explanation of the truth of propositions referring to non-trivial 
probabilities (those other than 0 and 1), requires the denial of the existence 
of a unique future. Callender’s rejection of this idea starts with the 
consideration that, even if true, it would be so only according to certain 
interpretations of chance—such as the Popperian propensity interpretation
—but not for all of them—for example, the Lewisian one. Furthermore: 
[…] the justification for the line that a ‘‘fixed’’ future implies trivial values of 
objective chance is similar if not identical to the famous argument for 
fatalism. The sea battle tomorrow spoils freedom today just as the radium 
atom’s decay tomorrow spoils non-trivial values of chance today. But if one 
believes, as I do, that the argument for fatalism is flawed […] then the 
existence of the sea battle tomorrow doesn’t undermine freedom today; one 
therefore needn’t see the tenseless view and its implications of either a sea 
battle or not tomorrow as a threat to freedom. Nor need it be a threat to 
non-trivial chances. The actual world may contain our radium atom in it 
decayed tomorrow, yet today it still may have a one-half chance of decaying. 
(2008, p. 70) 
I think Callender is right in reminding us that any appeal to objective 
probabilities, along with the indeterminism of the laws that justifies the true 
claims about those probabilities, is generally misplaced when used to derive 
conclusions about the openness of the future. As I will say with more details 
in chapter 4, section 4.2, indeterminism of laws is neither necessary nor 
suﬃcient for the open future (see also, Barnes & Cameron 2009). Thus, I 
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grant Callender that the defender of the conditional expressed by QOF 
should not take this way to argue for her view.  
 A rather diﬀerent, and at least prima facie more proposing strategy, is to     
argue for the existence of a mapping between states of superposition and 
objective openness of the future. In fact, in order for QOF to get correctly 
what a collapse is in the first place, as Callender correctly points out, we 
would need the superposition/eigenstate distinction to map sharply the 
open/fixed one. Roughly, through this mapping what you would get is that 
whatever system is in a superposition state will somehow indicate facts 
about openness. And similarly, everything that is represented by the theory 
as being in an eigenstate is meant to reproduce fixed facts.  
 However, according to Callender, it is not so clearly the case that     
superpositions and eigenstates can be mapped to the open/fixity distinction, 
for the following reason: 
[…] the symmetry of Hilbert space implies that we can write out our 
wavefunction in any of an indefinite number of bases, e.g., position, 
momentum, spin. A wavefunction that is a superposition in one basis may 
not be a superposition in another; for instance, the wavefunction of x-spin 
down is a superposition of up and down spins in the z-spin direction. Here a 
collapse to fixity in x-spin buys openness in z-spin. (2017, p. 95) 
The mechanism of collapse, by itself, does not pick up a preferred basis. 
Therefore, whenever a superposition on a certain basis disappears due to 
collapse, what happens is that the observable corresponding to another 
basis will immediately turn into a new superposition, provided it is 
incompatible with the first one (as it is in the example given by Callender of 
the x and y spin, and in virtually every case of superposition). Callender is 
here thinking of the collapse of the wavefunction as it appears in textbook 
quantum mechanics, wherein no basis is privileged over the other. I must 
say that am not completely certain whether this objection goes through 
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even for the textbook quantum mechanics case, since one could stress that 
that what makes a certain basis privileged in this case is the fact that 
someone performs a measurement. And once the measurement is 
performed, there is a basis which gives the right way to map openness and 
fixity. Be that as it may, what is more important is that in the case of 
spontaneous collapse models there always is a preferred basis—as I will 
show in chapter 1, section 1.3, this is mostly position—and we should only 
care about position superposition states and position eigenstates when we 
speak about the asymmetry between fixed past and open future.  
 Callender grants that much, but then immediately responds with a final     
objection to defenders of QOF by reminding that « in any realistic collapse 
theory such as GRW one doesn’t get collapses onto eigenstates, but only 
near eigenstates » (2017, p. 95). Hence, even granting, by focusing only on 
position states, that there is a mapping between superposition/eigenstate and 
the open/fixed distinction, in GRW type of interpretation collapses are 
never to eigenstates, but only near ones. And without eigenstates, the 
thought would go, we will not end up having openness properly. As I will 
show in chapter 1, section 1.3, the lack of eigenstates is a general problem 
for GRW (Lewis 1995), and one that is independent from any discussion on 
the open future. It is known in the literature as the tails problem (Albert & 
Loewer 1990), and it is actually considered by many philosophers and 
physicists to be the main flaw of spontaneous collapse models. It is fair to 
point out, however, that many solutions to the tails problem are on oﬀer (for 
a recent review of the literature, see Gao ms), and either Callender is willing 
to reject all of them altogether (along with with the viability of spontaneous 
collapse models) or the proponent of QOF could simply defend their view, 
once again, by  stressing that it is true only conditionalising on the solutions 
to the tails problem. That is the path I will follow in this dissertation, since I 
believe that if the tails problem is solved, collapse models can be taken as an 
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ideal starting point to argue for the open future via the mapping between 
superposition states and openness.  
 What will take a central stage in developing my arguments, is the     
intuition that we can reinforce our understanding of the diﬀerence between 
both dichotomies I aim at connecting—the superposition/eigenstate one on 
the one side, and the openness/fixity one on the other—by first 
understanding another dichotomy, the one between indeterminacy and 
determinacy. Indeed it is no chance, I believe, that indeterminacy 
understood in a robust, metaphysical way, recently made his appearance in 
discussions about both quantum mechanics and the open future. However, 
it did so in quite diﬀerent ways, and we should avoid the risk of confusing 
two kinds of indeterminacy that might share, after all, nothing but the 
name. In one case, the indeterminacy  about the open future is 
unsettledness between incompatible options. In the case of quantum 
mechanics, as I will show in the first and second chapters, it is not so clearly 
the case.  
 For these reasons, I will spend a large amount of time examining what     
sense we should make of quantum indeterminacy (chapter 1), how to 
account for it with metaphysical tools (chapter 2), and whether it is a part of 
the fundamental furniture of the world or rather a somewhat emergent 
phenomenon (chapter 3). Only when a better understating is made about 
all these crucial issues, will I eventually get back to connect quantum 
mechanics and the open future (chapter 4).  
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CHAPTER 1 
Quantum Indeterminacy 
1.1 A New Perspective on Quantum Mechanics             
This chapter is meant to introduce the reader to the topic that will be at the 
core of the following discussion, namely quantum indeterminacy 
(henceforth, QI). Many, if not all the things that have been said about what 
the world would be like according to quantum mechanics, eventually 
became with the years a matter of harsh philosophical dispute. What I will 
be saying here about the theory is admittedly no exception at all. However, 
a huge merit I believe of the recent debates on QI, is that it gives us an 
interestingly new perspective on many old issues. Roughly, and setting aside 
certain crucial diﬀerences (which will be largely discussed), the defenders 
of QI believe that quantum mechanics displays a radical kind of 
indeterminacy, one that we cannot understand as linguistic or epistemic in 
character. By properly interpreting the theory, according to some scholars 
we have discovered that the quantum world sometimes lacks definiteness or 
determination. This kind of indeterminacy could intuitively remind of what 
philosophers call ontic vagueness or metaphysical indeterminacy.  
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 The core idea of Metaphysical Indeterminacy (MI) is rather     
straightforward: at least in some cases, vague or indeterminate things 
(objects, properties, facts), are indeterminate not in virtue of the ways we 
refer to them, but because of the ways themselves are. Until the early 2000, 
few people took MI seriously, and many even thought that the very idea of 
the world lacking determination is, to use David Lewis’ (1993, p. 27) and 
Michael Dummett’s (1975, p. 413) word, « unintelligible ». A large part of 
the justification for such an attitude towards MI lay, on the one hand, on the 
argument by Gareth Evans (1978) against vague identity, and on the other 
in the success of the linguistic explanation of vague or indeterminate 
phenomena (see Fine 1978, inter alia). When we say that a cloud or a 
mountain lack determinate boundaries, we intuitively tend to blame the 
linguistic tools we use to refer to them. On this, as well as on many other 
respects, quantum mechanics seems to have radically changed the old point 
of view. In fact, if quantum mechanics really entails any indeterminacy (as 
defenders of QI maintain), then this would be rather hard to interpret as a 
mind-dependent feature of the world.  5
 In recent years the literature on QI has grown exponentially . Diﬀerent     6
ways of accounting for the phenomena have been put forward, and despite 
the disagreement on many crucial issues—whether QI is fundamental or 
not, whether it is independent from the way we interpret the theory or 
instead aﬀects only some interpretations, what specific feature of the theory 
generates it, and so on—a lot of scholars today take the possibility of QI 
very seriously. In this chapter I will touch upon the main topics discussed 
 Though see Ch.3, section 3.7, for discussion of the competing view. 5
 A list of papers include: Lowe (1994, 1999, 2001), French & Krause (1995), Darby (2010, 6
2014), Skow (2010), Bokulich (2014), Wolﬀ (2015), Lewis (2016), Torza (2018), Calosi & 
Wilson (2018, manuscript), Glick, (2018), Darby & Pickup (2019). 
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so far in the literature, and will thereby settle the discussion for some new 
topics which I will explore in what will follow. 
 Section (1.2) starts by analyzing what features of QM—independently     
from how we interpret the theory—might be the source of the 
indeterminacy. Section (1.3) builds upon the previous discussion, and adds 
considerations about the main interpretations of the theory, Bohmian, 
Everettian, and the Spontaneous Collapse Models. 
1.2 The Sources of Quantum Indeterminacy             
The idea that quantum mechanics displays a deeper sense of indeterminacy 
has been discussed in the literature since the very birth of the theory. 
Diﬀerent authors have focused on various quantum phenomena, including 
entanglement , the lack of space-time trajectories , superposition , 7 8 9
incompatible observables , and quantum statistics , arguing that they give 10 11
an empirical ground for metaphysical indeterminacy. However, it is only in 
the past few years that a certain agreement on the meaning of such 
indeterminacy has been reached. Many authors (Darby 2014, Bokulich 
2014, Wolﬀ 2015, Calosi & Wilson 2018, inter alia; for criticisms, see Glick 
2018) have reflected on the pervasiveness of a feature known as lack of value 
 Lowe (1994), French & Krause (2003), Bokulich (2014), Wolﬀ (2015), Calosi & Wilson 7
(2018). See Darby (2014) for a discussion.
 French & Krause (2006), and Bokulich (2014) for a criticism. 8
 Bokulich (2014), Wolﬀ (2015), Calosi & Wilson (forthcoming).9
 Darby (2010), Skow (2010), Bokulich (2014), Wolﬀ (2015), Calosi & Wilson (2018). 10
 French & Krause (2003, 2006). For criticism see Smith (2008) and Berto (2016). For 11
discussions see Darby (2014).
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definiteness (henceforth, LVD). We shall immediately notice that LVD is 
largely independent of how we interpret quantum mechanics. Of course, 
diﬀerent interpretations will account for LVD diﬀerently. Nonetheless, since 
it depends on the very mathematical formalism we use to formulate any 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, namely the Hilbert space formalism, 
this feature is at the heart of the quantum mechanics.  
 The properties of a physical system are described in quantum mechanics     
by operators in the Hilbert space (a complex vector space). Since the 
beginning of the last century, many experimental results have suggested 
that we just happen not to be able to know, jointly and with absolute 
certainty, the values of certain microscopic properties (the ones so-called 
incompatible). The most common example is that of position and 
momentum; the more accurate the value assigned to the one, the less 
accurate that of the other. This is an experimental fact. And the reason why 
the Hilbert space is such a powerful tool for describing quantum systems is, 
at least in part, because it provides a well defined mathematical way of 
talking about the systems we experience at the microscopic level.  
 To understand what LVD consists in, let us consider a very simple     
example stemming from quantum mechanics. To make things easier, we 
will discuss a quantum property known as spin. Very roughly, a way to 
visualize this property is by thinking of the classical angular momentum. If 
microscopic particles were billiard balls, their spin would be the direction at 
which they rotate on a certain axis. To simplify, we can take microscopic 
particles like electrons to have spin in three orthogonal directions, x y and z 
(each corresponding to a well defined operator on the vector space). 
Furthermore, spin is a quantized quantity, meaning it is discrete. Thus, for 
each orthogonal direction, electrons (which are fermions, and so have spin-
½) can only have two possible values, that we call up and down. It is again 
an empirical fact that diﬀerent spin components are, like position and 
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momentum, incompatible observables. That is, if we know, say, that the 
electron e has spin-down on the x-axis (suppose because we measured it), 
we thereby also know that its spin on the other two axis cannot in principle 
be assigned. Slightly more formally, we can use Dirac’s bra-ket notation to 
write the state of the electron as follows: 
 e = |↓x > [1]                                                                                                         
 e = |↓x > = 1/√2|↓z > + 1/√2|↑z >  [2]                                                           
 e = |↓x > = 1/√2|↓y > + 1/√2|↑y >  [3]                                                           
[1] express the fact that the electron is in an eigenstate of having the value 
‘down’ for the observable x-spin. [2] and [3] express the fact that being in an 
eigenstate of the observable x-spin implies being in a superposed state of the 
observables that are incompatible with x-spin, namely z-spin and y-spin 
respectively. What is allegedly the main interpretative issue in quantum 
mechanics is related to what we should say about states of superposition 
like the above. If a system is in superposition of a certain observable, this 
seems to suggest that it does not posses a definite value (it is neither ‘this’ 
nor ‘that’, although ‘being this’ and ‘being that’ exhaust the possibilities). 
How are we supposed to make sense of this?  
 The first, quite natural reaction is to stress that everything we just said     
merely indicates our epistemic limitations—we just happen not to know 
which is the value possessed by the system, yet it does always posses one. 
Historically, this option has been proven not viable. Many foundational 
results in quantum theory, such as the Bell inequalities and the Kochen-
Specker theorem, have shown that supplementing the theory with such 
hidden variables (which roughly are the values we do not know) does not 
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help completely eliminate states of superposition , which need to be taken 12
more seriously from an ontological perspective. As I shall show now, 
indeterminacy is one way of doing so. 
 Let us get back to LVD. Since to every eigenstate there are some     
corresponding superposition states, LVD in quantum mechanics is both 
pervasive and unavoidable. More generally, we can consider the standard 
way of reading physical properties oﬀ of the quantum formalism—that is a 
way to translate what the equations say about the world we live in. In QM, 
this role is played the so-called Eigenstate-Eigenvalue Link (EEL), which 
can be expressed as follows:  
EEL — A quantum system s has a definite value v for the observable O iﬀ 
it is in an eigenstate of O having eigenvalue v.  
From EEL, we can straightforwardly derive that systems that are not in 
eigenstate of having value v for the corresponding properties, do not possess 
a definite value for those properties. And given that, as we saw earlier, to 
each eigenstates there always are certain corresponding superposition 
states, QM along with EEL describe a world in which properties are often 
instantiated indefinitely. This is, in a nutshell, LVD in quantum mechanics.  
 A quite natural question to ask now, is why suppose that EEL is such an     
undeniable principle. EEL is at the core of the standard, orthodox 
 Slightly more technically, the results show that there is no way of assigning values to 12
certain sets of incompatible observables that is consistent with the experimental results. 
Thus, either quantum mechanics is false, or some values simply cannot be assigned in 
principle. And given the astonishing amount of predictive power of the theory, nobody 
would seriously consider the first option.
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interpretation of the theory . Other interpretations though, either revise 13
this principle or even drop it altogether . In the discussion about 14
metaphysical indeterminacy in QM, however, it is common to assume EEL 
as a good starting point, so as to give what David Wallace calls an 
«  interpretation-neutral discussion of the ontology of QM  » (2016). 
Everything else will then be build upon this by then taking into account the 
many relevant features that are not intepretation-neutral. By referring to 
EEL, we can give the following classification of the sources of QI : 15
Incompatible observables — All the observables that obey to 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle are called incompatibles (those 
that fail to commute). Examples include position and momentum, 
or distinct spin components in  mutually orthogonal directions. If 
two observables O’ and O’’ are incompatible, and a system S is in 
eigenstate for, say, O’, it follows from EEL that S does not have a 
definite value for O’’.  
 For an insightful philosophical discussion on EEL, and on how it relates to orthodox 13
QM and to the other interpretations, see the recent paper by David Wallace (2016). 
Wallace argues extensively for the view that EEL is nothing but a ‘philosophical tool’, while 
the theory itself does not mention at all of it. Be that as it may, something like the EEL is 
needed whenever we start posing ontological questions to QM, which is clearly the 
business of those who reflects on quantum indeterminacy.
 See, e.g., Albert & Loewer (1996) for spontaneous collapse models, and Goldstein 14
(2001) for hidden variables theories.
 I am following Calosi & Wilson (2018) in giving this three-fold classification. There is 15
however no general consensus in the literature concerning which phenomena we should 
count as genuine source of MI, about what is the catalogue of them, and more importantly 
about what relation (of priority, for instance) there is between them. Just to make an 
example, Bokulich (2014), and Wolﬀ (2015) present a classification slightly diﬀerent from 
the one above, either by removing one of the sources (usually superposition and 
incompatible observables are considered two faces of the same coin), or by adding 
quantum statistics as a further source (for more on this, see French & Krause 2006).
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Superposition — We can formulate the principle of superposition 
(PS) as follows:  
PS: If a and b represent pure states of a system S, then their linear 
sum c is such that it also represents a possible state of a 
system.   
Although it is not in an eigenstate, c does represent a possible state 
of the system S, and from EEL it follows that the system S lacks a 
definite value for the corresponding observable.  
Entanglement  — The component of the two entangled systems 
each lack determinate value for some observables O1 and O2, 
though the observable O12 corresponding to the sum of O1 and O2 
is in an eigenstate. LVD is implied by the failure of the components 
of the entangled systems to be in eigenstates. Without being in an 
eigenstate, from EEL it follows they both lack definite values. 
The three feature of quantum mechanics listed above are distinct from each 
other in at least three respects: (i) mathematical, (ii) epistemological, and 
(iii) conceptual or metaphysical.  
 As regards to (i), as argued by Calosi & Wilson (2018), the mathematical     
features underpinning each source of QI are distinct: the non-
commutativity of the operators in the case of incompatible observables, the 
linear sum in the case of superposition, and the laws of the tensor product in 
the case of entanglement.  
 As regards to (ii), we shall notice from an epistemological perspective,     
that the linearity of the Schrödinger equation and the non-commutativity of 
operators cannot be derived from the mathematical facts underpinning the 
other quantum phenomena. Furthermore, without the non commutativity 
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of the operators, a theory with the principle of superposition cannot be 
distinguished epistemically from a theory without it (see Hughes 1989). 
 As regards to (iii), the metaphysical diﬀerences between the three     
sources, we could notice that indeterminacy in the case of superposition 
aﬀects a single system, while in the two other cases we need to refer to a 
plurality, either of at least two diﬀerent systems (case of entanglement)  or 16
of two diﬀerent parts of the same system (incompatible observables). This 
means, I believe, that QI in the case of superposition is somehow 
metaphysically privileged, at least in that it gives us a clearer perspective on 
many issues. 
 The many diﬀerences between the three sources of QI invite a further     
consideration. Although we should expect, at least in principle, that a 
theory of QI would take care of each case, it is realistic to always remind us 
that this might not be the case in practice. In the next chapter, I will discuss 
diﬀerent metaphysical approaches to QI, and show the diﬃculties for some 
of them to account for some features, and for some others to account for 
others. In the end, the intuition that QI is the same phenomenon in each 
case can surely be used as a guiding principle, or as a starting point, yet it is 
also one that we should be ready to revise at each step.   
 A concluding remark, connected to the previous one, concerns more     
generally whether there is any relation of dependence or priority between 
the sources of QI. Indeed, were there any such relation, one could argue 
that an account of QI should first focus on whatever turns out to be more 
fundamental. Perhaps, in order to find a promising strategy we should start 
looking at how quantum theories diﬀer from classical mechanics. After all, 
classical mechanics makes no mention of indeterminacy in the same way as 
QM does, which also means that once we understand the main distinction 
 See Hasegawa (2012) for a case of entanglement in a simpler system. I notice however, 16
that in this case it would apply what I say about the plurality needed in the case of 
incompatible observables. 
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between classical and quantum mechanics, we also discover what makes the 
latter special with respect to indeterminacy. However, this is not as easy as it 
might seem. In the history of quantum mechanics, we find at least three 
views, and it would be hard to decide which is to be preferred. Paul Dirac 
(1930, 10-18) famously maintained that the biggest diﬀerence between 
classical and quantum mechanics is to be found in the way in which the 
principle of superposition puts constraints on the sets of possible states to 
be modeled in the Hilbert Space. While Dirac took the principle of 
superposition to be crucial for QM, others have focused on the uncertainty 
principle in instead. For instance, Hanson (1967, p. 45) reminds us that « 
John von Neumann generated all of quantum mechanics from an 
operationally suitable statement of the uncertainty relations alone ». Finally, 
we find a third view in those who believe that both principles, also taken 
separately, are enough to explain the main diﬀerence with classical 
mechanics. Here is, for instance, Hughes (1989): 
The principle of superposition tells us something about the set of admissible 
states, the uncertainty principle something about the set of observables 
encountered in the theory. Any theory which includes either of these 
principles is, we may say, inherently probabilistic; that is, each principle 
entails that there are pure states which assign to the outcomes of certain 
experiments probabilities other than one or zero. When the principle of 
superposition holds we can construct such states from any pair of states 
which assign a probability of one to diﬀerent outcomes of a given 
experiment. (p. 83) 
As I mentioned, it would be very hard to establish which view should be 
preferred. It is however interesting to point out that there is no overall 
consensus on this issue, and therefore no preferred route one could take 
while in the business of providing an account of QI.  
 24
———————————       The Indeterminate Present       ——————————— 
1.3 QI Meets the Measurement Problem            
So far the discussion about QI has been quite straightforward. I have started 
from how the theory would work as a description of the physical the world, 
and shown that given some of its features, such description entails a 
peculiar kind of indeterminacy. We all know, however, that this whole story 
cannot be that simple, since we are talking about a theory, QM, on which 
philosophers and physicists have been disputing over almost a century. And 
most importantly for us, it is not that simple since a large part of those 
disputes were mainly concerned with the status of the theory qua 
representation of the physical world—which is, once again, something that 
I was deliberately assuming to be true in the previous section. My aim in 
this section is to provide a more nuanced analysis of QI vis à vis the issue of 
how the theory can be taken as representing the physical world, that is how 
we interpret quantum mechanics. I will focus on the three main realist  17
interpretations, the Everettian, the Bohmian, and the one I am more 
interested in here, the Spontaneous Collapse Models. 
 Let us start by considering Spontaneous Collapse interpretations, the     
most famous of which is GRW (from Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber, 1986). In 
order to solve the measurement problem, GRW supplements the standard 
deterministic dynamics of the Schrödinger equation with a new equation. 
While the former equation, being linear, gives rise to superposition states, 
the latter is meant to break the linearity by introducing a fundamentally 
 By ‘realist’ (see Miller 2014) I mean those views that take the quantum state as 17
representing something objective in the world, rather than a representational device. I set 
aside the possibility that ‘orthodox’ QM could be interpreted realistically, and consider 
only those theory that are enough developed to make reasonable to discuss them without 
ambiguity. Although many participants to the debate on quantum indeterminacy have 
tried to argue that MI could be use to make sense of orthodox QM in a realist fashion (see 
Bokulich 2014), I do not think this is a promising way to go, for the measurement problem 
would still remain a big obstacle, untouched by any consideration about indeterminacy.
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stochastic physical process, the collapse of the wavefunction. According to 
this new dynamics, every system has a certain probability per unit time of 
undergoing a hit, thereby collapsing into a more definite state. And that is 
the first reason why GRW is a fundamentally indeterministic theory. If we 
take two perfectly indistinguishable quantum systems, the new dynamics is 
such that even if the probability for both systems of undergoing a hit is the 
same, they might evolve diﬀerently. In other words, whether or not a 
collapse occurs,  and where the collapse is centered, for a system S at a time 
t cannot be derived from the status of S at t plus the initial condition. 
However, GRW is fundamentally indeterministic also in a second, much 
more radical sense. When a collapse occurs, the wavefunction is multiplied 
by a narrow Gaussian function that has tails stretching to infinity in all 
directions in 3d space. This means that collapses in GRW are never to 
eigenstates, but only near ones. This is known in the literature as the tails 
problem, and it is certainly the main drawback of GRW. There are two types 
of solution to this problem, both with interesting consequences regarding 
quantum indeterminacy, so I will spend some time on them .  18
GRW Link approach — Substitutes the Eigenstate-Eigenvalue Link 
with a new principle that ascribe definite properties to quantum 
systems. Two main ways: 
• GRW Fuzzy Link (Albert & Loewer 1992) — A quantum 
system has a definite value v for a particular observable O iﬀ 
the square projection of its state into an eigenstate of O is 
greater than 1-P, for some (arbitrarily chosen) P.  
 I should mention that Peter Lewis (2006) has argued that the diﬀerences between the 18
approaches to GRW I mention is less substantial than what it first seems, and that 
eventually there only is one GRW. Though I believe his view deserves much attention, I 
will not discuss it in this occasion.
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• GRW Vague Link (Lewis 2016) — A system has a determinate 
value for a given determinable to the extent that the square 
projection of its state onto an eigenstate of the corresponding 
operator is close to 1.  
GRW Primitive Ontology approach — Provides an underlying 
ontology that is always determinate, and regards the residual 
indeterminacy as derivative. Two ways:  
• GRWm —Mass Density (Ghirardi & al. 1995, Allori 2013); 
• GRWf — Flash (Bell 1987, Tumulka 2006a). 
The main diﬀerent between the approaches above, lies in whether they 
allow for indeterminacy only at a derivative level or also at the fundamental 
one. I will discuss this issue further in chapter 3, but for now I shall notice 
that the diﬀerent approaches to GRW provide many equally good examples 
of how quantum mechanics could imply some indeterminacy . 19
 Let us now consider the Everettian, or many worlds interpretation of     
QM. This family of interpretations introduces the branching process which 
multiplies the worlds and eliminates macroscopic superposition states 
within a branch. The superposition across the branches is then interpreted 
as an emergent feature of reality, since the worlds themselves are « emergent 
entities » (see Wallace 2012). However, it is crucial to notice that, in 
Everettian interpretations, there still remains superposition within the 
ranches before the decoherence is imposed on the system. Furthermore, 
there also seems to be a further kind of indeterminacy that concerns the 
number of branches (which is generated by the relevant probabilities). 
Schematically, in Everett type of interpretation we find three kinds of 
indeterminacy.  
 For criticism, see Glick (2018), and the discussion of his view in chapter 3.19
 27
———————————       The Indeterminate Present       ——————————— 
1. Emergent indeterminacy across branches; 
2. Epistemic indeterminacy in the number of branches (see Wilson, 
ms); 
3. Metaphysical indeterminacy within branches before decoherence. 
As for GRW, a final remark here should be made regarding whether the 
type of indeterminacy in (3)—which is the only one we are interested in 
here—is to be considered fundamental or not. Many view the Everettian 
interpretation as describing, at the fundamental level, only a multi 
dimensional wavefunction. Everything else, on such views, is thus 
considered derivative (see Ney Albert 2013). However, a main problem with 
interpretation is precisely how we are supposed to recover, from the 
wavefunction, the ordinary 3d space (see Lewis 2004, 2013). And no matter 
how we do this in detail, there will still remain the issue of how we interpret 
the indeterminacy within a branch of quantum systems before decoherence. 
Fundamental or derivative, there seem to be some MI (see Calosi & Wilson 
ms).  
 Let us finally consider Bohmian mechanics. In this view, the positions of     
the fundamental ontological items, say the particles, are always determinate 
(Bohm 1951). We do not know the precise values for all observables, but the 
fundamental ontology is made by particles that always possess determinate 
positions. Thus, it seems that indeterminacy in Bohmian mechanics is 
simply epistemic. What about those properties that, unlike position, are not 
fundamental? Asking this question, Peter Lewis (2016) invites us to 
consider spin as a good example, and observes that « although the Bohmian 
strategy arguably makes all the properties we directly observe determinate, 
it does not thereby make all properties determinate » (p. 101). This means, I 
believe, that we could map the possibilities into the following three views:  
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Eliminativist Bohmian View (Miller 2013, Esfeld 2014) — Positions 
are the only properties full stop: merely epistemic indeterminacy. 
Hierarchical Bohmian View — Spin is a real physical property, but it 
is not a fundamental one: derivative metaphysical indeterminacy. 
Egalitarian Bohmian View — Spin is as fundamental as position; 
fundamental metaphysical indeterminacy. 
Although nowadays the first position is probably the most common, the 
other two can also be attractive for various reasons. The main one worth 
mentioning, is that eliminativism is generally considered to be problematic 
when it comes to recovering the 3dimensional macroscopic world, since it 
is populated by properties other than position. This means that although for 
the Bohmian type of interpretation indeterminacy can be seen as merely an 
epistemic phenomenon, there also are views in the vicinity on which QI is a 
worldly feature. 
 In conclusion, in this chapter I have shown that QI emerges from many     
features of quantum mechanics, and, in one way or the other, it aﬀects each 
of the three main interpretations of the theory. In chapter 3 I will consider 
an objection, made by David Glick (2018), against part of my above 
conclusions. Before that, however, I will now turn to chapter 2 and to how 
metaphysics could help us getting a better understanding of QI.  
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CHAPTER 2 
The Metaphysics of Quantum Indeterminacy 
2.1  Metaphysical Indeterminacy  
Our representations of the world, our thoughts and linguistic expressions 
can often be imprecise, or such that they partially lack determination. 
While this is uncontroversial, it is however controversial whether the world 
itself can lack determination, or in other words whether there can be 
worldly, metaphysical indeterminacy (MI for short). There is a growing 
literature in philosophy discussing whether and how we can make sense of 
MI or, as the received view has it in the spirit of David Lewis’s claim that 
‘[t]he only intelligible account of vagueness locates it in our thought and 
language  » (1986, p. 212), all indeterminacy has a semantic source. As I 
mentioned in the first chapter, one question which has taken central stage 
in this discussion is whether certain interpretations of quantum mechanics 
entail the existence of MI. This question is particularly important, since if 
they do, then this appears to give us a good reason to abandon the received 
view that indeterminacy is a purely semantic phenomenon and to accept 
the existence of MI.  
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 In the previous chapter I gave some initial support to the idea that     
quantum indeterminacy is a serious challenge to the received view on 
indeterminacy being never a metaphysical matter, and the next chapter 3 
will further defend QI against some objections. Here I will momentarily 
assume that QI is a worldly issue, and one that needs be taken care by 
metaphysics. Therefore, I will be exploring what are the options we have on 
the table in order to give a systematic account of it. I will show in details 
what appears to be the two main contenders, the object-level approach (see 
Wilson 2013, Calosi & Wilson 2018), and the meta-level approach (see 
Barnes & Williams 2011) and shall argue that the former is to be preferred. 
In short, the object-level approach on MI maintains that, along with 
determinate state of aﬀairs, the world is also constituted by indeterminate 
ones. The diﬀerence between the two families of state of aﬀairs is to be 
found in how properties are instantiated. The meta-level approach on MI, 
instead, locates the indeterminacy at a higher level, in that while state of 
aﬀairs are always determinate, they sometimes do not obtain determinately.  
 The most developed version of the meta-level approach is the theory     
developed by Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams in a number of papers 
(Barnes 2010, Barnes & Williams 2011, Barnes 2013, Williams 2008). Their 
account, also known as the metaphysical supervaluationist theory, has been 
criticized for being unable to account for QI (as already argued by Darby 
2010, Skow 2010, Calosi & Wilson 2018). Although I agree with the spirit of 
this critique, in this chapter I will elaborate a new version of the meta-level 
approach, which I believe does better than the previous ones in accounting 
for QI. I will then conclude by explaining some potential drawbacks of the 
object-level view, and yet argue that it still is our best shot to account for QI.  
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2.2  Metaphysical Supervaluationism  
The fundamental idea of supervaluationism (Barnes & Williams 2011) is 
that metaphysical indeterminacy can be modeled as indeterminacy in 
which of a range of admissible metaphysical precisifications of the actual 
world correctly represents it. In this section, I will first introduce Barnes & 
Williams’ version of the theory and then give a rationale for why one should 
adopt a supervaluationist theory along these lines, instead of one of the 
rival theories of MI which have been proposed in the literature. 
 Barnes and Williams’ theory is modeled on the supervaluationist theory     
of vagueness. Vagueness is a particular sort of indeterminacy which aﬀects 
predicates and is closely linked to the sorites paradox . According to, as 20
one may call it, semantic supervaluationism, vagueness is unsettledness 
regarding which of a range of admissible precisifications of a particular 
language is correct, where a precisification is a complete valuation of this 
language. Here is how this account of vagueness roughly plays out.  
 A characteristic feature of vague predicates is that they do not allow us to     
draw a sharp line between objects to which they definitely apply and objects 
to which they definitely fail to apply. Take for example the predicate ‘is bald’. 
There are some people to which the predicate definitely applies (think of a 
person with absolutely no hairs on their head) and others to which it 
definitely fails to apply (think of a person which a full head of hair). But 
then there are also some people who are neither definitely bald, nor 
definitely not bald (think of someone who is in the process of balding, but 
has a significant amount of hair, like probably myself in few years). This 
feature of vague predicates is highly problematic, since it renders them 
susceptible to the sorites paradox. This problem could easily be avoided by 
 See Fine 1978, Keefe 2000, ch. 7 & 8, and Varzi 2007, for influential defenses of the 20
theory.
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introducing a sharp delineation between e.g. the bald and the non-bald by 
fiat. If we do this for each predicate of a language, the result will be what 
supervaluationists call a semantic precisification of the language, a complete 
classical evaluation of the language. Semantic supervaluationism is based 
on the idea that languages containing vague predicates always admit of a 
multitude of admissible semantic precisifications, semantic precisifications 
which are not a priori ruled out by established conventions governing the 
meaning of the expressions of the language. The core idea of 
supervaluationism is that vagueness can be understood as unsettledness 
regarding which of these admissible semantic precisifications gives us the 
correct interpretation of the language.  
 Metaphysical Supervaluationism (MS for short) adopts this idea and     
applies it to MI. The idea is that in cases of MI there are diﬀerent admissible 
precisifications of the actual world, and it is unsettled which of them 
corresponds to the actual world. Let us unpack this claim. The three 
concepts which need explaining here are that of unsettledness, that of a 
precisification of the actual world, and that of correspondence between such a 
precisification and the actual world.  
 There are fundamentally two ways to understand ‘unsettled’. First, one     
may take the concept expressed by this predicate to be distinct from that of 
indeterminacy. This reading turns the core idea of supervaluationism into a 
reductive claim. A semantic supervaluationist may for example treat 
unsettledness as a form of ambiguity, and then claim that vagueness is a 
special kind of ambiguity. In the metaphysical case, it is not quite clear 
whether this reading of the notion of unsettledness applies. At any rate, I 
will not further discuss this option for the simple reason that I will instead 
follow the second approach, also taken by Barnes & Williams (2011). 
According to them, the notion expressed by ‘unsettled’ in our schematic 
statement of the idea should be replaced by a pre-theoretical notion of 
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indefiniteness, which is, crucially, not further analysable (see Barnes & 
Williams 2011, pp. 108ﬀ.). This means that the account of MI on oﬀer in 
Barnes and Williams’s variant of MS is non-reductive in the sense that it 
relies on a primitive notion of indeterminacy, which cannot be explained in 
terms of other elements of fundamental ontology.  
 Barnes and Williams identify precisifications of the actual world with     
ersatz possible worlds which stand in a particular relation to it, i.e. to our 
reality (Barnes & Williams 2011). Let us first clarify what an ersatz world is. 
In contrast to the possible worlds posited by modal realism which are 
exactly the same sort of maximally connected (analogous) spatiotemporal 
wholes (cf. Lewis 1986), ersatz worlds are abstract entities which are posited 
to play certain theoretical roles in philosophical theories. For the purposes 
of illustration it might help to think of them as maximally consistent sets of 
propositions, but we can remain neutral regarding questions of what sort of 
entities ersatz worlds are, as long as they are fit to play these roles. As I have 
just made clear, Barnes and Williams take MI to be metaphysically 
primitive, which means that their reliance on ersatz worlds in their theory 
should not be confused with a commitment to a substantive claim about the 
nature of MI. Ersatz worlds are in no sense the building blocks of MI, they 
are just the elements of a machinery that helps us specifying the semantic 
behavior of the primitive notion. 
 Now we still have to say what it takes for an ersatz world to qualify as a     
precisification of the actual world. Barnes and Williams’s idea is that the 
precisifications of the actual world are those ersatz worlds which do not 
determinately misrepresent reality, i.e. the actual world (see Barnes & 
Williams 2011, 115). 
 This leaves the third notion, that of correspondence between the actual     
world and an ersatz world. Since, unlike the actual world, ersatz worlds are 
abstract entities, correspondence here cannot simply mean identity. No 
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ersatz worlds can be actual. However, leaving MI aside, one of the ersatz 
worlds can be actualized, which means that it is the one ersatz world which 
correctly represents all the actual truths, i.e. the truths which hold in the 
actual world.  
 Putting these notions back together, we get the following core claim of     
Barnes & Williams’ version of metaphysical supervaluationism:  
Core claim of MS — It is metaphysically indeterminate whether A if, 
and only if, there is an ersatz world w which is a precisification of 
the actual world in which p and an ersatz world w’ which is a 
precisification of the actual world in which ~p and it is indefinite 
which of w and w’ is the actualized ersatz world.  
As I will discuss later, Barnes and Williams 2011 somewhat modify this idea 
when spelling out the formal details of their theory, but these modifications 
are clearly meant to stay faithful to the core claim. MS is an elegant 
metaphysical theory, and does justice to the idea that metaphysical 
indeterminacy is an intelligible notion, contrary to what David Lewis 
thought. In this dissertation I will deliberately set aside some metaphysical 
objections one could move against MS (see e.g., Akiba 2015), and rather I 
will only focus on the objection according to which the model cannot 
account for quantum indeterminacy. The next section shows what it 
consists in.  
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2.3  The QM-based objection to MS 
This section is dedicated to the arguments against Metaphysical 
Supervaluationism based on quantum mechanics. I start with some general 
remarks about the scope of the objections, with the aim of avoiding certain 
confusion that is often in the literature. In the second part I then focus on 
Skow (2010) and Darby (2010), who both independently argued against MS 
based on the Kochen-Specker no-go theorem of QM. 
 As I mentioned, the literature on MI in quantum mechanics has been     
growing exponentially in the past few years, and there still is large 
disagreement on many issues. Nonetheless, a seemingly widespread 
consensus is that MS is not able to capture what Skow (2010) calls deep 
metaphysical indeterminacy, that is indeterminacy in QM. Given that many 
(including Barnes & Williams (2011) themselves) seem to take QM to be 
the main motivation for pursuing a theory of Metaphysical Indeterminacy, 
if MS is unable to account for it then the account would lose a great deal of 
its appeal, and would thereby become less motivated. A plausible 
explanation for this is that the sort of MI arising from QM cannot easily be 
explained away as merely semantic, while it has been argued that some 
other purported examples of MI given in the literature can . 21
 However, when asking whether MS is compatible with quantum     
indeterminacy, two issues need be addressed before even starting any 
further analysis. First, what feature of QM, if any, really forces us to accept 
metaphysical indeterminacy? Second, do all interpretations of the theory 
imply the same result? David Glick (2018), for instance, has recently argued 
that QM does not force us to accept MI, and even suggested (p.c.) that it is a 
main desideratum for any interpretation that it avoids metaphysical 
 See in particular the discussions of a semantic supervaluationist (dis-)solution of the 21
problem of the many in Eklund 2008, Lewis 1988, Lopez de Sa 2008, 2013.
 36
———————————       The Indeterminate Present       ——————————— 
indeterminacy (I will largely discuss this objection in chapter 3). Notice that 
if none of the main interpretations of QM involve MI, as Glick argues, then 
MS is still (although trivially) a valid option as an account of MI. However, 
it would also lose one of its motivations (perhaps the main one). A similar 
consideration would follow from taking quantum indeterminacy to be 
merely of an epistemic kind (as for the Bohmian interpretation of QM). No 
matter what the details about which interpretation is correct, or which 
interpretation is a viable option and which is not, MS would be more solidly 
motivated if at least some interpretations entail indeterminacy. And more 
generally, the more endemic quantum indeterminacy is, the more MS 
would be motivated. Therefore, MS (i) has to accept the existence of 
quantum (metaphysical) indeterminacy, and (ii) needs the resources to 
account for it. Darby (2010), Skow (2010), and Calosi & Wilson (2018) 
argues that MS does not have resources to account for quantum 
indeterminacy, thus violating (ii). As to the why (ii) is violated, as I 
mentioned Darby and Skow disagree with Calosi and Wilson, and so I will 
treat them separately. According to Darby and Skow, the reason why MS 
fails should be found in the Kochen-Specker no-go theorem (KS for short). 
Calosi and Wilson, instead, believe that there is no need to mention KS, 
because the structural dependencies between quantum observables is 
enough to show why MS cannot account for quantum indeterminacy. 
Although I agree with Calosi & Wilson, I will first spend some time on the 
KS based objection, given its importance in the literature on QI. 
 To show why, according to Skow and Darby, MS fails as an account of QI,     
let us first see how it would work. What I shall call the naive implementation 
of MS, in the quantum case, is to interpret each side of a superposition state 
as a precisificational possibility, and construe an example of MI thereby. 
However, this implementation fails because in some cases (namely, cases 
when some of subspaces corresponding to the properties are not 
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independent) we cannot assign values to all properties of a quantum 
systems. Here I will first consider how the naive implementation might work
—by  considering a quantum case where it might seem to work—and then I 
will show why it does not work (using KS). 
 First, the naive implementation at work. Suppose we perform a spin     
measurement (with a Stern-Gerlach) on a quantum system S in the 
direction z, and find the system in eigenstate of spin-up: 
  
 S = |up z>     
Diﬀerent spin components in QM are incompatible observables, which 
means that if a system S is in eigenstate of a certain orthogonal direction (z, 
in our example), then the system S is in a superposition in both the other 
directions (in the example: x, y). Thus, we can write the state as follows: 
S = |up z > = 1/r2 |down x > + 1/r2 |up x >  
S = |up z > = 1/r2 |down y > + 1/r2 |up y > 
In this case, according to MS, the following are true: 
i. DET ( S = up z  ) 
ii. DET not ( S = down z ) 
iii. IND ( S = up x )  
iv. IND ( S = down x ) 
v. IND ( S = up y )  
vi. IND ( S = down y ) 
(1)-(2) are true because according to every precisificational possibility—
possibilities that do not determinately misrepresent the system—the system 
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has spin-up in z. (3)-(6) are true because according to some precisificational 
possibilities the system is in a diﬀerent state. 
 Second, why the naive implementation does not work. In the above     
simple example the set-up seemed to be such that the value assignments to 
properties of the system were independent one to another. This simply 
means that assigning up in one direction allows for either up or down in the 
other one. (Only ‘in part’ independent, however, because if we pick each 
precisificational possibility, either up or down for the same direction has to 
be the case). Thus, we would have 4 values assignments, each corresponding 
to a precisificational possibility (pp): 
pp1: ( S = up z  ) & ( S = down y ) & ( S = down x ) 
pp2: ( S = up z  ) & ( S = up y ) & ( S = down x ) 
pp3: ( S = up z  ) & ( S = down y ) & ( S = up x ) 
pp4: ( S = up z  ) & ( S = up y ) & ( S = up x ) 
Recall that every pp, according to MS, has to be perfectly precise (pps are 
maximally complete set of sentences). As correctly argued by both Darby 
and Skow, the assumption that each pp is precise (has values for all 
properties, as it is in (pp1)-(pp4)) is crucial for MS. Besides, as they both 
notice, assigning precise values to all properties mirrors the strategy that 
the naive ‘hidden-variable’ strategy tried to pursue. According to this 
strategy, all properties possess a definite value at all times, but we are 
ignorant about those values. The Kochen-Specker theorem goes against the 
naive hidden-variable theories, by showing that it is impossible to assign 
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values to all the properties . Hidden-variable theorists can pick up a 22
preferred basis (usually position), and claim that only position assignments 
are always definite (even when we do not know which). This option, 
however, would undermine the motivations for MS, for it would give up 
quantum indeterminacy altogether (at least at the fundamental level). 
 The question before us is whether the states described in  (pp1)-(pp4) are     
possible states in QM. The answer is no, as first was shown by Kochen and 
Specker (67) . To write down the conjunction of the states in each of 23
(pp1)-(pp4) would require to write a state like the following (let’s take for 
instance (pp1)):  
 ( S = up z ) + ( S = down y ) + ( S = down x )     
This state however, makes no sense in QM, for it goes against the constraint 
that assignment of spin values to diﬀerent spin components has to be equal 
to 2 (because Sx + Sy + Sz = 2). In other words, it must be the case that one 
of the three conjuncts is assigned value 0.  
 Observables (like spin) in QM are represented by operators in a     
multidimensional vector space. When an operator gets value 1 (the vector 
with which it is associated is an eigenvector), the subspace corresponding to 
it has value 1. However, diﬀerent operators (corresponding to diﬀerent 
properties, such as diﬀerent spin components) may share the same subspace 
(and so the same value associated with it). KS type of theorems exploits this 
 Certain interpretation of QM bites the bullet and reject non-contextuality. This means 22
that assignment of values might depend on the experimental set-up, and thus the very 
same observable can be assigned 0 or 1 depending on the context. I will not explore this 
option further, because as I said I am explicitly interested in those interpretation of the 
theory that accept instead value indefiniteness.
 In fact, KS requires a much more complicated set of vectors to get to their result. I am 23
here over simplifying this point to make it conceptually more salient. 
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feature of QM to generate examples in which sharing subspaces puts 
constraints on value assignments, so that: either we cannot always assign 
values, or we run into the contradiction of assigning to the same 
observables two incompatible values (0 or 1). To avoid contradictions, this 
naturally leads to value indefiniteness of QM.  
 Some concluding remarks are in order. MS requires the precisificational     
possibilities to be completely precise, but according to QM we cannot 
always assign precise values to quantum properties (value indefiniteness). 
Therefore, MS cannot account for quantum indeterminacy. In the next 
section (2.4) I will first consider some possible ways out for MS and show 
why they fail, before turning my attention, in section 2.5, to a version of MS 
which I believe eﬀectively escapes the objection. 
2.4  Ways out for MS     
In this section I will briefly evaluate some possible ways of escaping the QM 
based objection to MS. Before getting into the details, let me first set aside a 
possible response that a defender of MS could give, which I believe does not 
deserve much scrutiny despite its initial appealing. The idea would be 
simply to reject quantum indeterminacy, for instance by appealing to the 
recent paper by David Glick (2018), who extensively argues for 
eliminativism about QI. In chapter 3 I will spend more time on Glick’s view, 
but what is important here is to stress that proponents of MS should not 
take this route, because it would basically throw the baby out with the 
bathwater. After all, as I mentioned, MS needs QI in order to give more 
support to the view. 
 A much better line of defense for Barnes & Williams’ MS could be to     
 41
———————————       The Indeterminate Present       ——————————— 
insist that their model is ersatzist. Thus, rather than concluding from KS 
that there is no actual world, since in MS all actual worlds are precise, we 
should say that no possible world can correctly represent reality (i.e., no 
world can be actualized). But this conclusion is what we should expect, 
given that possible worlds are representations that are precise in all 
respects, and reality is assumed to be indeterminate. In the MS account, 
however, it is unsettled which possible world is @, but each possible world 
is precise. So, given that KS rules out the possibility that a precise 
representation of the world is correct, it is determinate that no world 
represents correctly the actual world. And this is why MS account is 
incapable of capturing the indeterminacy at the heart of QM. 
 Another way to escape to the objection, would be for Barnes & Williams     
to simply take oﬀ orthodox QM from the set of the acceptable 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. Skow (2010) objects to this by noting 
that it does not matter whether or not orthodox QM is the correct 
interpretation: 
Let me emphasize that it is not part of my argument that the orthodox 
interpretation of quantum mechanics is, in fact, correct. There are many 
other interpretations of quantum mechanics (Bohmian mechanics, for 
example, and the many Everettian interpretations) that make no use of the 
notion of metaphysical indeterminacy. If we reject the orthodox 
interpretation and accept one of them instead then we will not have to say 
that there is actually any deep metaphysical indeterminacy. But it will still 
be true that the metaphysical indeterminacy in the orthodox interpretation 
of quantum mechanics is a possible kind of metaphysical indeterminacy. 
(2010, p. 8)   
Recall that MS aims to capture all possible cases of MI. Orthodox QM 
might not be the correct interpretation, but it is still a possible case of MI. 
Therefore, MS fails at capturing all possible cases. First note that, in order 
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for this argument to work, we need the further assumption that orthodox 
QM is metaphysically possible. However, a supporter of MS might simply 
deny this. Where Skow sees a Modus Ponens, Barnes & Williams might see 
a Modus Tollens.  
 There are however other good reasons for not rejecting orthodox QM.     
One reason is that, in the light of KS theorem and of Bell’s inequality, it 
does seem a well-confirmed hypothesis. Moreover, anyone who shares a 
certain naturalistic attitude towards physics, would probably find the 
rejection of orthodox QM not well motivated. 
 Another response to the objection, recognized by Skow himself, is for     
MS to allow for partial precisifications. Skow is however skeptical about this 
for the following reason: 
For suppose we keep their framework but replace perfectly precise possible 
worlds with imprecise possible worlds (sets of sentences from a language 
that suﬀers from semantic indeterminacy). Even when there is no meta-
physical indeterminacy we can expect it to happen that several imprecise 
possible worlds do not determinately fail to correctly represent reality. So 
using imprecise worlds would give us multiple actuality even when there is 
no metaphysical indeterminacy.  
Skow’s idea here, as I understand it, is that if we use use imprecise worlds as 
ersatz to represent quantum indeterminacy, we would also need to allow for 
imprecise world when representing standard case. After all, many imprecise 
representation will not determinately fail to correctly represent reality (that 
is the definition of the metaphysical precisifications) even when there is no 
indeterminacy. However, defenders of MS can simply bite the bullet here , 24
or even find a way to distinguish two kinds of metaphysical precisifications. 
 See for instance Torza (2017, 2018) and Darby & Pickup (2019) for developments of this 24
view. I will not discuss these views further, since my main interest here is to provide a 
version of MS that stays faithful to the idea that the representations need be fully classical, 
rather than imprecise or incomplete.  
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So I do not think Skow’s point actually goes through. There is, however, 
another worry with partial or imprecise precisification, that is that they 
imply a significant departure from the spirit of MS. In its spirit, MS aims at 
capturing indeterminacy as unsettledness between classical, complete 
options. If this main tenet of the theory is dropped, I feel that other 
accounts of MI would be preferable. 
 Finally, an option for MS would be to provide a more hybrid view and     
allow for some indeterminacy at the level of objects . Recall that the main 25
problem with MS is that in the model, even though it is indeterminate 
which possible world is the actualized world, each possible world is precise. 
Given KS, it follows that no possible world can be the actualized world. This 
is a collapse of the model, if we understand the indeterminacy at issue as 
unsettledness with respect to which precise representation is the correct 
one. In a sense, the problem with the model is that, given how it is 
constructed, it is impossible that any of the available representations be a 
correct representation of its target. In other words, there is something 
wrong with trying to capture the indeterminacy of QM as unsettledness 
concerning which precise representation of the world is correct, given that 
it is determinate that none is.  
 However, one could still coherently keep the machinery of ersatz worlds     
as precise representations if one does not locate the indeterminacy merely 
at the level of unsettledness concerning which representation is the correct 
one, but also more directly at the level of the target of the representation. 
The idea is then to understand the actual world @ as a concrete entity (or at 
least not as an inherently representational one) constituted by 
indeterminate state of aﬀairs (along the lines of Jessica Wilson’s (2013) view, 
for instance). Between the actual world @ and the ersatz possible worlds W 
= {w1, w2 … wn}, we could introduce two kinds of representation relations. 
 I thank Giuliano Torrengo for this idea.25
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‘R’, which express the idea of an entirely correct representation, and ‘RQM’ 
which express the idea of a representation correct modulo claims 
concerning attribution of properties based on QM.  
 If we want to capture the indeterminacy of QM, we can then proceed as     
follows. It is quite trivial that, given KS, we cannot say much with ‘R’, 
basically just that it is not the case that there exists a possible world w in W 
such that Rw@. However, ’RQM’ is much more interesting, since it allow us 
to reconstruct truth conditions for claims about indeterminate matter in a 
way that is analogous to that of MS, without succumbing to KS-based 
objections. Rather than having a set of Multiple Actuality, here we define a 
set A of worlds that are representations of @ that are correct in so far as we 
bracket quantum mechanics. In other terms, in A goes any representation w 
such that RQMw@. The idea is that each world in A represents a distribution 
of quantum mechanics relevant properties in a precise manner, together 
with all the macroscopical facts about @. No world in A represents the 
quantum mechanics relevant aspects of the world right—they cannot, given 
KS—but they all get the macroscopic ones right, as it were   
 It should be clear that if we make this move there is no risk of running     
into the complaint that in this model there is no actual world. It is true that 
none of the ersatz possible worlds represent correctly the actual world, and 
hence no possible world is actualized. But this is because of the deep 
diﬀerence between the actual world and the merely possible worlds in this 
model. While the merely possible worlds are representational entities whose 
target is the actual world, the actual world is a non-representational entity. 
Given that the representations in the model are all precise, while the actual 
world is indeterminate, the actual world cannot be represented correctly. 
However, given the possibility of exploiting (in the meta-language) 
representations relations which require only partial correctness, such as 
‘RQMw@’, we can model the behavior of claims about indeterminate matter 
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by resorting to the truth value of such claims relative to the ersatz worlds in 
A. 
 I think there are three objections one could move against the above view,     
two of which are particularly worrying. First, it might seem ad hoc to 
simply  make the theory blind to quantum indeterminacy, if after all we are 
in fact in the business of accounting for it. I do not think this is a big worry 
though, because a good response is to stress that the model provides precise 
conditions through which we distinguish cases of quantum indeterminacy 
from classical cases, and this is enough as a defense for MS. The second 
worry starts precisely when we ask what are the conditions for quantum 
indeterminacy, that is how we define the relation RQM. We cannot simply 
say that everything that QM says is represented through RQM, because we 
want to keep many statements from the theory, some of which are perfectly 
determinate in truth value. And neither can we put in RQM only what counts 
as indeterminate. First, because it would be weird, to say the least, for a 
theory of MI to account for everything but indeterminacy. And second, 
because it is not clear whether we can actually do it. QM should be taken as 
a whole, and the parts of the theory which allow for determinate states are 
the very same that display indeterminacy in some other cases.  
 I have argued extensively that many of the responses MS could give to     
the objection based on QM are unsatisfactory for various reasons. I now 
move to what I believe is the best version of MS, what I call Plural 
Metaphysical Supervaluationism, which I think is the only one that 
eﬀectively responds to the objection moved by Skow (2010) and Darby 
(2010). 
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2.5  Plural Metaphysical Supervaluationism  26
The main point of this section is to introduce a version of MS which avoids 
an important objection to Barnes and Williams’s version of the theory, 
namely the objection that it cannot account for a particular sort of MI to 
which certain interpretations of quantum mechanics give rise. My version 
shares the core claim of their theory: MI can be modeled as indeterminacy 
regarding which of a range of precisification is actualized. However, it also 
departs from it in an important way. This departure, which I will discuss in 
detail later on, is not only motivated by the quantum mechanics based 
objection to their theory, but is also independently motivated by an internal 
tension in it. To bring out the tension, we need to say a bit more about the 
formal part of their theory. 
 Barnes and Williams’s theory consists of two components. First, a     
primitivist account of the nature of MI and an account of how to reason 
about MI which consists of a logic characterized by a model theoretic 
semantics plus a definition of logical consequence. The second component 
is based on the core idea of their theory, the idea that MI can be 
characterized as indeterminacy regarding which precisification of reality is 
correct. In Barnes & Williams 2011, three diﬀerent semantics for three 
diﬀerent object languages are developed. The first for the language of first-
order quantified modal logic, a language which contains a propositional 
modal operator which can be used to express modal claims like “it is 
necessary that p”, the second for a language which in addition contains a 
definitely-operator which allows one to formulate claims about MI in the 
object language. This operator is however only allowed to take widest scope 
 The option I explore in this section has been developed in a joint work with Robert 26
Michels and Giuliano Torrengo.
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over sentences not containing the operator . The third semantics is a 27
semantics for a language in which this syntactic restriction on the sentences 
containing the D-operators is lifted and in which the operator is allows to 
freely combine with itself, the logical constants, and the modal operators. 
These three semantics are accompanied by definitions of logical 
consequence which are designed to be classical in the sense that the 
resulting logic contains all theorems of classical first-order logic and that 
these notions of consequence obeys the same rules of inference as the 
standard notion of consequence of that logic.  
 The tension concerns a particular feature of the models used to interpret     
the three diﬀerent languages. These models contain a set of ersatz worlds 
and in addition single out one of these worlds as the actualized world of the 
model. This designated world of the model plays a crucial role in their logic, 
as they define logical consequence in terms of truth in all models, where the 
notion of truth in a model is in turn defined as truth at the actual world of 
the model (see Barnes & Williams 2011, 124, 129, 133).  
 The crucial point is that each model of Barnes and Williams’s model     
theory contains one world which is singled out as the actualized world of 
the model. But if each model explicitly specifies the actualized world, how 
can such a model reflect the core idea of the theory, the idea that MI is 
indeterminacy regarding which precisificationally possible ersatz world is 
actualized? There is no such indeterminacy to be found in their models. 
 To be fair, Barnes and Williams adopt a modification of their core idea     
when moving from the semantics for the first of their three languages to 
that for the second and third. Leaving the technical details of the changes in 
their modal theory aside, Barnes and Williams define a notion of truth 
 So if A is an arbitrarily complex closed or open sentence of the language of first-order 27
quantified modal logic, the second object language will contain the sentence DA. Note 
that it will not contain any logically complex sentences involving sentences of this form as 
sub-formulas.
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simpliciter as truth in the intended model, where this intended model as 
before singles out one world as the designated actualized precisificationally 
possible world of the model . They write: « Our guiding conception of 28
metaphysical indeterminacy has it that one among the possible worlds ‘gets 
matters right », but it was indeterminate which world that was. To this point 
I have specified three of the four elements of the intended model: the space 
of worlds, domain, and interpretation. So the candidates to be the intended 
model are the various models containing those three elements together with 
some specified ersatz world. Some of these models will designate as actual 
worlds that are determinately non‐actual. These models will be 
determinately unintended. Some models will designate worlds that are 
neither determinately actual nor determinately non‐actual (what we called 
the ontic precisifications). These models will be neither determinately 
intended nor determinately unintended. (Barnes & Williams 2011, 125-6.) 
In this new setting, MI is in fact no longer directly modeled as 
indeterminacy regarding which precisifically possible world is actualized in 
a model, but rather as indeterminacy regarding which model specifying an 
actualized world does this correctly.  
 The result of this change is a shift from a theory which models MI as a     
particular modality to a theory which models it as what one might call a 
meta-modality. Conceived of as a modal notion as in the initial core idea of 
SM, that it is metaphysically indeterminate whether p is reflected by there 
being, in the intended model, two precisificationally possible worlds, one in 
which p is true, another in which ~p is true. In this case, the definiteness-
 With respect to the third language, things are a bit more complicated. In the 28
corresponding model theory, the intended model contains the designated selection 
function which precisifies all halos of indeterminacy (sets of worlds) including in 
particular the one designated halo of indeterminacy in the correct way, i.e. picks out one 
world among the worlds which are actually precisificationally possible as the one world 
which is actualized. See Barnes & Williams 2011, section 6.1 for a full explanation of the 
model theory and the definition.
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operator of the second and third language is interpreted via quantification 
over precisifications and it allows us to directly expresses claims about MI. 
According to Barnes and Williams’s modified core idea, that the world is 
metaphysically indeterminate regarding whether p is reflected by there 
being two models which both correctly represent reality, save for that one 
contains an actualized world in which p, the other one in which ~p is true. 
Claims about MI are understood in terms of quantification over models. As 
a consequence, they are not longer directly expressible in the object 
language using the Definiteness-operator, since that operator has its 
interpretation fixed with respect to a single model.  
 There are several problems with this new version of the core idea. Briefly:     
first, the object-language D-operator can no longer be said to directly 
express claims of MI, for the reason just given. This means that the theory 
de facto introduces a second, distinct kind of MI, even though it is 
supposed to model a single phenomenon.  
 Second, earlier in their paper, Barnes and Williams insist that «  our     
‘precisifications’ will be worlds rather than interpretations of a 
language » (Barnes & Williams 2011, 115). While this claim of course still 
holds for MI as expressed by claims involving the D-Operator, the same 
cannot be said about MI as reflected by indeterminacy in which model is 
intended. Models are mathematical structures which are used to interpret 
formal languages, so it seems that Barnes and Williams claim no longer 
holds if the new version of the core idea is adopted. The theory has earlier 
been criticised by failing to model a distinctively metaphysical, rather than 
a semantic kind of indeterminacy in Akiba 2015 and this point appears to 
corroborate this criticism.  
 Third, another criticism due to Wilson is that Barnes and Williams’s     
theory of MI is a meta-level account and as such fails to genuinely locate MI 
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in the world. The new core idea can be seen to support this criticism, as it 
delegates MI to an even higher level of abstraction in the model theory. 
 I will not discuss these problems in more detail here, since my aim is not     
to argue that Barnes and Williams’ modification of MS’ core idea is 
inadmissible. The relevant point for me is just there is a tension between the 
original core idea, and the fact that Barnes and Williams’s model contains 
designated actual worlds. Their modification to the core idea deviates 
significantly from the spirit of the original core idea in ways which may be 
contested. 
 The core diﬀerence between my version of MS and that of Barnes and     
Williams is that it takes the relation which holds between reality (or the 
actual world, our universe, as opposed to the abstract ersatz worlds) and the 
ersatz worlds in a model which qualify as precisifications of reality to be a 
plural relation. Barnes and Williams take this relation, call it Rp, to be a 
singular relation which holds between reality and one ersatz world.  
 My proposal is to replace this singular relation by a relation which relates     
reality to a plurality of worlds. Importantly, I claim that the plurality of 
these worlds is irreducibly plural in cases of MI. Irreducibly plural 
instantiations of properties are properties which are instantiated by a 
plurality of objects oo, but neither by any of the single objects among the oo, 
nor by any sub-plurality, i.e. any plurality consisting of some objects among 
the oo, but not all of them. There is nothing unusual about such cases. 
Think for example of the relational property of joining hands together to 
form a line around the base of the Empire State Building. We can imagine a 
group of protesters which forms a very tight line around the building, so 
that none of them could leave without breaking the line . I claim that the 29
 Contrast this to a cases in which the protesters form a less tight line, so that one or two 29
of them could leave without breaking the line, or think of a rather fantastic scenario in 
which someone has such enormously long arms that they alone can form a tight line 
around the building by joining their two hands.
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relation of being a precisification of reality, it Rpp, as applied to a plurality of 
ersatz worlds in cases of MI is of this kind: each of the worlds contributes to 
precisifying reality in such a case, but none of the worlds alone counts as a 
precisification of reality on its own and neither do just some, but not all of 
the relevant worlds.  
 So consider a case in which reality is metaphysically indeterminate     
regarding whether p is the case. In this case, there are two ersatz worlds 
which correctly represent all the actual facts if we disregard p. One of the 
two will represent reality as being such that p, the other as being such that 
~p. But, metaphorically speaking, both of them have to work together to 
count as precisifications of reality, so neither of the two alone does. This is 
the basic idea of Plural MS. 
 As a contrast case, consider the case that there is no MI in reality. Just     
like Barnes and Williams’s version of MS for the language involving no 
Definiteness-operator, Plural MS will model these cases as such that there is 
a single ersatz world which is actualized. Note that this is perfectly 
compatible with the move to  Rpp. Rpp  accepts single ersatz worlds as 
limiting cases of pluralities of ersatz worlds and in such cases, the 
requirement that the relevant worlds together and only together as a whole 
precisify worlds is trivially met. 
 The move to Rpp has several consequences for the overall theory. One     
consequence concerns the intuitive interpretation of what it means to count 
as a precisification. Barnes and Williams characterize their relation Rp 
indirectly as holding between reality (or, since they generalize their theory 
to possible worlds, a possible world) and an ersatz world which « does not 
determinately misrepresent reality  » (Barnes & Williams 2011, 115). One 
might straightforwardly adapt this characterization to the plural relation 
Rpp by simply describing it as the relation which holds between reality and a 
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plurality of ersatz worlds which only taken together as a complete plurality 
are such that they do not determinately misrepresent reality.  
 This is one option, however there is another: we might instead     
characterize the relation as that of holding between reality and a plurality of 
ersatz worlds which only taken together as a complete plurality are such 
that they do give us a precise representation of reality. The second 
characterization gives us, to use a term introduced by Calosi & Wilson 
(2018), a glutty view of MI: only if we take all the single worlds which 
together qualify as being precisificationally possible into account do we get 
the full picture of what MI is like (according to MS).  
 The second characterization of Rpp also suggests an answer to an open     
question about MI, namely whether there is higher order MI. This question 
is inherited from the discussion about vagueness, i.e. about a particular 
kind of indeterminacy which aﬀects predicates and is closely tied to the 
sorites paradox. Most contributors to this discussion take it at as a datum 
about vague predicates that they are not only vague, but also higher order 
vague. A vague predicate like “is bald” not only fails to draw an exact 
boundary between the bald and the non-bald, but also fails to draw an exact 
boundaries between the definitely bald and the not-definitely bald, and the 
definitely definitely bald and the not definitely definitely bald, and so on . 30
However, MI should clearly be distinguished from metaphysical vagueness 
(see e.g., Eklund 2008), so the near consensus about the existence of higher-
order vagueness should not compel us to to accept the existence of higher-
order MI. The second characterization in fact can be taken to suggest that 
there is no higher-order MI: If it is metaphysically indeterminate whether 
reality is such that p, Plural MS models this as there being two ersatz worlds 
which together count as precisifying reality. The resulting picture is 
perfectly precise. One of the worlds is such that p, the other such that ~p 
 See e.g. Sainsbury (1996), and Wright (1992, 2009) for a dissenting voice.30
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and these two worlds together both localize the MI and furthermore 
indicate all the ways the world could be, were it precise with respect to p. 
Likewise for more complex cases in which the determinacy involves a range 
of mutually exclusive alternative states of aspects of reality. 
 The discussion about MI contains significantly diﬀerent purported     
examples of MI. Some for example claim that the openness of the future 
should be understood in terms of MI, others link MI to material objects 
with fuzzy boundaries, and there are of course those who argue that 
quantum mechanics give rise to MI. It is not clear whether these examples 
all involve the same sort of MI. We believe that Plural MS is flexible enough 
to accommodate these diﬀerent examples of MI, but there might be 
diﬀerences between them regarding whether they involve not only first-
order, but also higher-order MI. Accordingly, the reading of the second 
characterization of Rpp which rules out higher-order MI might suit some 
types of examples better than others. Importantly, it seems that it suits the 
particular sort of MI which can be argued to arise from quantum 
mechanics which will take center stage in the following section.   
 A core question about any version of supervaluationism is how it handles     
the notion of truth. The standard approach in semantic supervaluationism 
is to identify truth with super-truth, i.e. truth in all admissible 
precisifications, but the framework oﬀers the resources to define diﬀerent 
notions of truth. In the application of the theory to quantum 
indeterminacy, I will rely on the notion of super-truth to give us a notion 
which tracks what the quantum state tells us about the states of the world. 
In cases of quantum MI, there will as a consequence be propositions which 
fail to express super-truths. Accordingly, I will, in one sense, not have a 
classical, bivalent object language. I will however make use of the flexibility 
of the framework to define classical notions of logical truth and 
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consequence. This bi-furcated approach to truth will be introduced and 
motivated in the following subsections.  
 Let us return to the tension in Barnes and Williams’ theory. If we go     
plural and if we want to model MI using a model theoretic semantics at the 
model-level, rather than at a meta-model level, it no longer makes sense to 
include a designated actualized world in the models. No ersatz world alone 
qualifies as a precisification of reality, so no ersatz world can be singled out 
as being the actualized world of the model, the one world which correctly 
represents reality. 
 These are the core ideas of Plural MS. Since this version of MS was     
introduced, at least in part, in order to overcome the objections based on 
QM, I shall now analyse how Plural MS does indeed the job. 
2.6  Plural MS and the QM objection  
To see how PMS accounts for quantum indeterminacy, let us consider again 
the example from section 2.4, where we had S = |up z>, from which we  also 
known that it is indeterminate whether S = |up x> or S = |down x> and 
likewise that it is indeterminate whether S =|up y> or S = |down y>. 
According to PMS, there are four worlds which are together and only 
together as a whole precisificationally possible, and which represent the 
following states as obtaining:  
pp1: ( S = up z  ) & ( S = down y ) & ( S = down x ) 
pp2: ( S = up z  ) & ( S = up y ) & ( S = down x ) 
pp3: ( S = up z  ) & ( S = down y ) & ( S = up x ) 
pp4: ( S = up z  ) & ( S = up y ) & ( S = up x ) 
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This gives us a model in which S = |up z> is supertrue, but neither of the 
attributions of up or down spin to x or y have this status. Supertruth is here 
the relevant notion of truth concerning what goes on in the quantum 
system.  
 A crucial feature of the model is that it considers the pps to be classical,     
in the sense that quantum laws do not hold in them. Calosi & Wilson 
(2018) object against a move close to my own:  
Taking precisifications to be ones in which classical laws are operative 
violates supervaluationist constraints on admissible precisifications—
namely, that precisifications cannot be determinately incompatible with 
(cannot determinately misrepresent) the actual world. In particular, the true 
claim that ‘the position and momentum of a system cannot be jointly fully 
precise’ is determinately true if the actual world is, as we are assuming, a 
quantum world; but classical worlds in which every system has determinate 
position and momentum will be worlds in which this claim is false, not true; 
hence any such world would fail to be an admissible precisification. (p. 18) 
In response, we shall notice that, contrary to standard MS, here 
admissibility should not be taken as applying to single precisificational 
possibilities. Admissibility is rather a notion that in our model makes sense 
for a plurality. Quantum laws are rather to be taken as meta-laws, laws that 
provides constraints on possible precisifications. Although this might seem 
prima facie unusual, I believe there are at least two reasons, one from 
physics and from metaphysics, why it is only superficially so. First, recent 
works on quantum theory aims precisely at defending the view that 
quantum theory is to a great extent a priori (D’Ariano et al. 2017). Second, 
we could appeal to the distinction, to be found in Maudlin (2007) between 
dynamical laws—FLOTEs, Fundamental Laws of Temporal Evolution—and 
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adjunct principles, and maintain that the latter only are those that provide 
meta-level constraints on possible precisifications. 
 Although there is still a lot of work to be done for PMS to account for     
quantum indeterminacy, I believe the view is on the right track to respond 
to Darby and Skow’s kind of objection. Furthermore, allow for classical 
(non quantum) representations seems to be something we should expect if 
we want our theory of MI to respect the main tenet of the meta-level 
accounts. The intuition here is that QI is a non classical phenomenon, and 
yet the only thing we have to understand it are our representations, which 
are after all classical.  
 Nonetheless, in the next section of this chapter I will show that the     
situation for meta-level approaches gets even worst than what Skow and 
Darby imagined. I will therefore considered, in the final section, the object-
level as the main alternative, and show why I take it as our best shot as an 
account of QI.  
2.7  Calosi & Wilson’s objection to MS     
I now consider another, even stronger objection to MS, from Calosi & 
Wilson (2018). The main diﬀerence with the objection based on the 
Kochen-Specker is that Calosi and Wilson consider all the main 
interpretations of QM, while Skow and Darby seem to rely on possibility of 
the orthodox interpretation of QM being a genuine one. This is a crucial 
issue here, so let us what they mean. First, let us recall that Skow (2010) 
believes the objection only needs that orthodox QM is at least a genuine 
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possibility. On a similar vein, in a footnote Alisa Bokulich (2014) writes, 
even more explicitly: 
One might object that the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics is 
only an instrumentalist theory, and that it only makes sense to inquire into 
the metaphysical implications of a “realist” theory of quantum mechanics, 
such as Bohm’s hidden-variable interpretation. I think this objection is a 
mistake: For any theory one can take either a realist or instrumentalist 
attitude towards it […] In this paper I am taking a realist attitude towards 
the standard interpretation, and asking what the world would be like if this 
interpretation were true. Those who think that there can only be realist 
interpretations of theories such as Bohm’s, conflate “realist” with 
“resembling classical mechanics”. (fn 460) 
I agree here with Calosi & Wilson (2018), however, in noticing that this 
kind of considerations about the orthodox interpretation can be easily 
overcome. Many have indeed claimed that the notion of measurement in the 
standard, orthodox view of QM is so ill-defined to make the question of 
whether or not this view is consistent hard to even pose correctly (just to 
mention one, see Bell 1987). Therefore, it would be quite a small problem 
for MS if the model would not be able to account for this possibility.  
 For these reasons, Calosi & Wilson claim to be able to provide a much     
stronger line of reasoning concerning why quantum indeterminacy should 
lead to the rejection of MS. Instead of focusing on the Kochen-Specker 
theorem, and on the Orthodox interpretation only, they consider a number 
of crucial features of QM—namely, the ones we met earlier in chapter 1, 
superposition, incompatible observables, and entanglement—and argue that 
they are, in one way or the other, present in each of the main live 
interpretations of QM. The main reason for this is, more generally than the 
KS, the structure of dependencies between properties (observables) in the 
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formalism(s) of quantum mechanics. Thus, their main claim is that, for 
each interpretation, either there is no metaphysical indeterminacy, or if 
there is, MS cannot account for it. 
 Let us start considering GRW type of interpretation. Having in mind     
what has been said in chapter 1, section 1.3, the conclusion we should draw 
is two-fold. First, on the primitive ontology approaches, although there is 
some residual indeterminacy, it only concerns the derivative level of reality. 
At the fundamental level, both the flashes and the mass distribution are 
entirely determinate (see also, Glick 2018). As per the link approaches, 
instead, the indeterminacy can be seen as fundamental, as also Lewis (2016) 
notices. Calosi & Wilson (2018) consider both strategies, and concludes 
that the possibility of residual indeterminacy in the primitive ontology 
approach « at least renders unclear the compatibility of this interpretation 
with a supervaluationist approach » (p. 14). The reason is again based—and, 
to be clear, independently from results like the Kochen-Specker theorem—
on the dependencies between property ascriptions to quantum systems. In 
the case of the primitive ontology approach to GRW, this is true at least for 
certain complex, macroscopical systems, and even granting that the 
fundamental ontology is free from any indeterminacy. As for the linking 
principles approaches on GRW—although Calosi & Wilson are not explicit 
on this—the rejection of MS is also based on dependencies between 
quantum properties, but here it would be even more problematic given that 
it would be at the fundamental level.  
 Turning to Everettian QM, the situation might seem more promising at     
first, for one could think that each branch represents a metaphysical 
precisification. However, recall from chapter 1 that the residual 
metaphysical indeterminacy in Everettian interpretation is the one within 
each world before decoherence, and not the one across the diﬀerent 
branches. And although one could argue that MS is able to account for the 
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emergent indeterminacy across the branches, this eﬀort would be rendered 
useless since there would still remain the other type of indeterminacy left 
unexplained.  
 Finally, similar considerations apply to Bohmian mechanics, where, as     
we saw in the first chapter, either the indeterminacy is merely epistemic—as 
for eliminitivist bohmians—or it is such that MS cannot account for it. 
Indeed, if it is not only epistemic, then properties like spin are considered to 
be real, even if only derivative, so that arguments like the ones above would 
work. 
 A general remark is here in order. As we saw, Calosi & Wilson do not     
appeal to the Kochen-Specker no-go theorem in their objections, mainly 
because they maintain, and rightly so, that the structure of dependencies 
between quantum properties (in many live interpretation of the theory) 
would be enough to rule out MS. This is certainly true, unless the rejection 
of the Kochen-Specker type of objection is motivated on a more general 
rejection of MI altogether, which again should not be case for defenders of 
MS. In this sense, we shall conclude that appealing to the Kochen-Specker 
theorem is misleading, unless motivated by a rejection of MI - which, we 
notice, is not the case in both Darby (2010) and Skow (2010).  
 In conclusion, Calosi & Wilson (2018) argue that on many     
interpretations of QM, the structure of properties dependencies is such to 
rule out the core assumption of MS according to which single 
precisificational possibilities are always precise. Therefore, they suggest that 
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2.8  Object-Level Indeterminacy   
In this last section my focus will be on the other approach on MI, on how it 
relates to quantum indeterminacy, and finally on some of its potential flaws. 
Alisa Bokulich (2014) has been the first to connect explicitly quantum 
indeterminacy with this other approach to metaphysical indeterminacy, 
namely Jessica Wilson’s (2013) object-level approach. In Wilson’s view, 
indeterminacy is treated in terms of the distinction between determinables 
properties and determinates properties, and MI obtains when there is an 
object having a determinable property without a determinate value for that 
property: 
What it is for an SOA [state of aﬀairs] to be MI [metaphysically indeterminate] in a given 
respect R at time t is for the SOA to constitutively involve an object (more generally, entity) 
O such that (i) O has a determinable property P at t, and (ii) for some level L of 
determination of P, O does not have a unique level-L determinate of P at t. (Wilson 2013, 
366)  
So, for instance, an object will always have a determinable property such as 
being colored, whilst it could lack a determinate property like being red or 
being green. Bokulich (2014), Wolﬀ (2015), and, more systematically, Calosi 
and Wilson (2018), use this machinery in the case of QM. The idea is that 
quantum particles are not vague objects but rather that they have vague 
properties. The spin is again a good example. An electron will always have 
the determinable property of having x-spin while lacking, in specific 
situation, the determinate property of having x-spin-up or having x-spin-
down.  
 Wilson’s account, unlike MS, locates indeterminacy at the level of objects     
and properties. Indeed, Wilson’s view is diﬀerent to this respect from 
almost every other approach to MI. The only account that shares some 
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similarities with Wilson’s is the one developed by Nick Smith and Gideon 
Rosen (2004): «Our paradigm for the indeterminate object is an object that 
possesses length, but no determinate length, or color, but no determinate 
color  » (p. 198). In Wilson’s view there are indeterminate state of aﬀairs 
(SOAs), and which of them obtains is always a determinate matter. The 
indeterminate SOAs are those in which a determinable is instantiated, even 
though either no unique determinate (for some level of its determination) is 
instantiated (‘glutty’ MI), or any determinate is instantiated (‘gappy’ MI). In 
contrast, on MS, as we have seen, it is unsettled which among many precise 
SOA obtains, since it is unsettled which possible world is actualized. 
Furthermore, object-level accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy do not 
run the risk of attributing properties in a way that violates the constraints of 
KS theorem, since they explicitly allow for indeterminate state of aﬀairs.  
 Bokulich (2014), Wolﬀ (2015), and more extensively Calosi & Wilson     
(2018) all argue that Wilson’s determinable based approach can be used to 
understand quantum indeterminacy. A major issue is what specific 
implementation of the account is to be preferred in the quantum case, 
whether the gappy or the glutty one. Although Bokulich (2014) and Wolﬀ 
(2015) suggest that a gappy implementation would be preferable, Calosi & 
Wilson (2018) show a potential problem with this approach, thereby 
arguing for the glutty implementation instead. The first major problem is 
that the lack of determinates would make it impossible to distinguish 
diﬀerent probability weights in the theory. Take a case in which a system S’ 
is in a superposition in the x-spin of 70% up and 30% down, and another 
system S’’ which is also in superposition in the x-spin, but instead it is 71% 
up and 29% down. From a metaphysical perspective, the gappy approach 
does not possess the resources to distinguish the two cases, since in both of 
them the situation is exactly the same: both S’ and S’’ possess the 
determinable x-spin, and both lack the corresponding determinates. A 
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glutty implementation seems to be in better position here, because the 
diﬀerent statistical weight can be accounted for by the existence of both 
determinates. Of course, here as well, we need to say more about why the 
existence of both determinates will eventually result in a diﬀerent statistical 
weight. Calosi & Wilson suggest in a footnote that maybe the only way to 
go here is to allow for degree-theoretic instantiation of properties. Roughly 
the idea would be that, to take the example above, the diﬀerence between S’ 
and S’’ lies in the diﬀerence between the degree in which the determinate x-
spin up and x-spin down are instantiated. Even then though, there would 
still is the issue of why degrees of instantiation are so related to 
measurement results . By itself, to say that a certain physical system 31
instantiates properties in diﬀerent degrees, does not say much about why, 
when performing measurement, the system picks up one property over the 
other. I take this to be the major challenge for the object-level glutty 
approach, and I believe that future developments of the theory will need to 
account for it.  
 Another problem with the gappy implementation, which is also a     
problem for virtually any account of the meta-level type, is how to explain 
the well-known phenomenon of quantum interference. In the standard 
experimental set-up, quantum particles produce an interference pattern 
when fired through a double slit. If one of the main desiderata for a theory 
of quantum indeterminacy is to understand, from an ontological 
perspective, what a superposition state consists in, then clearly the double-
slit experiment is a crucial test. Suppose one says that (before decoherence, 
objective collapse, the experimenter influencing the apparatus, of what you 
have) the particle is in superposition of ‘passing through the upper slit’ and 
‘passing through the lower slit’. If we want to explain how system shows an 
interference pattern, we clearly cannot say that the particle did not pass 
 A problem recognized by Claudio Calosi himself (p.c.).31
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either of the slits (the system lacks both determinates corresponding to the 
determinable position). If it lacks both determinates, the interference would 
be left unexplained. And as I was saying, this is a problem for the meta-level 
approach too. In this case, it is not even clear how worldly unsettledness 
between two options (the electron passing through the upper and passing 
through the lower slit) can interfere. Once again, the glutty implementation 
can solve this problem by claiming that the interference is produced by the 
interaction between the determinates properties. 
 The object-level approach, and in particular the glutty implementation of     
it, is preferable over MS to account for quantum indeterminacy. However, 
this by itself does not mean that the account has no problems. For instance, 
as Wilson herself points out, her view is incompatible with an assumption 
concerning the determinable/determinate distinction that is often regarded 
as central and non-negotiable. That is, the assumption that every time an 
entity instantiates a determinable properties, there is exactly one 
determinate (for each level of determination) that the entity instantiates. As 
Funkhauser (2006) has it: 
An object instantiating a determinable must also instantiate some determinate under that 
determinable. Colored objects must be red or yellow or blue, etc. No object is merely 
colored simpliciter. (Funkhauser 2006, p. 549) 
In Wilson’s view, determinable properties are non-reducible (2013, p. 382). 
The distinctive link between a determinable and a determinate is that 
instantiating a determinate is tantamount to an increase of determination 
in the SOA. But an entity O does not possess a determinable in virtue of 
instantiating exactly one determinate, and indeed if O is in a indeterminate 
SOA, then it may fail to instantiate any determinate while instantiating the 
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relative determinable . To stick with the previous example, an electron may 32
instantiate the determinable property of having spin direction while lacking, 
in specific situation, the determinate property of having spin-up and having 
spin-down in that direction. 
 The idea that instantiating a determinable requires instantiating exactly     
one determinate (for each level of determination) is indeed very natural and 
Wilson argues at length to defend her somewhat unorthodox alternative. 
One of the strongest argument against Wilson’s view that I can think of, is 
that in order to distinguish the determinable-determinate distinction from 
the genus-species distinction, we need to appeal to the fact that the 
instantiation of the determinable is metaphysically explained by the 
instantiation of the determinate. This is diﬀerent to the genus-species case, 
in which the instantiation of the species-related properties are at least 
partially explained by the instantiation of the genus-related properties. For 
instance, we can explain why a certain apple is colored by appealing to a 
certain determinate shade of red it exemplifies. While we (at least partially) 
explain properties that are possessed by my cat by appealing to the fact that 
she is a feline. If so, it is in the very nature of the determinable-determinate 
distinction to respect the constraint that Wilson’s account jettisons.  
 However, perhaps this criticism is too quick. After all, Wilson may agree     
that the determinate has usually a certain primacy of explanatory role, but 
the story need not to be so simple in every case. Even when no specific 
determinate is instantiated, the determinable does not ‘float free’ with 
respect to the determinates that the entity could instantiate (and maybe 
does instantiate in diﬀerent circumstances – for instance, after the 
measurement). Be that as it may, there is an alternative view to Wilson’s, 
 Wilson considers also another situation in which an object could enter an indeterminate 32
SOA, when it instantiates a determinable, but instantiates more than one determinate, 
since it instantiates determinates only in a relive manner. I will not dwell upon this 
alternative here, since it is less relevant for QM (as also Bokulich 2014 notices).
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which seems to catch just as much as her view, without having to abandon 
the assumption that instantiating a determinable requires the instantiation 
of a determinate. I briefly considering this alternative and present it is as a 
sort of a challenge to Wilson’s view. 
 If one accepts Wilson’s idea that it is determined which SOAs obtain, and     
the indeterminacy is rather in the SOAs themselves, one may think that 
indeterminate SOAs are those whose determinables are possessed in virtue 
of instantiating the determinate being indeterminate with respect to a given 
property (to stick again to the previous example, the determinate being 
indeterminate with respect to the property of having spin-up direction or 
having spin-down direction). Unlike Wilson’s view, this proposal does not 
give up the assumption an entity O instantiates a determinable in virtue of 
O instantiating precisely one determinate (of a given level). Rather, besides 
“determinate” determinates such as having spin-up direction or having spin-
down direction, there are also “indeterminate” determinate such as being 
indeterminate with respect to the property of having spin-up direction or 
having spin-down direction.  
 This proposal is incompatible with Wilson’s. However, even if not     
particularly attractive, it is coherent and has the advantage of being more 
“conservative” than primitivism about determinables. It may also have some 
explanatory advantages. For instance, instantiating the “indeterminate” 
determinate (as being indeterminate as to having spin-up direction or having 
spin-down direction) excludes the instantiation of other determinates of the 
same level (such as having spin-up direction or having spin-down direction). 
This is as we should expect, and the result is a consequence of a general fact 
about the determinable-determinate relation. I do not wish to defend this 
position here, though. Rather, it suﬃces to point out that there may be 
‘object level’ alternatives to Wilson’s proposal that also escape the problem 
raised by KS.  
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 Another potential threat to Wilson’s view concerns whether     
indeterminacy of properties is related to indeterminacy of identity 
conditions. Since his famous paper from (1976), nobody who wishes to 
account for worldly indeterminacy has aimed at challenging Evans’ 
argument, and rather tried to circumventing it. The result is roughly that 
whatever MI is, it should not imply indeterminacy in identity conditions. It 
would be worrying of course if Wilson’s account does. Note that, according 
to the view, even if the electron lacks definiteness relative to a certain level 
of determination, it is not itself vague, in the sense that identity claims 
concerning it have determinate truth values. For instance, it is 
determinately the case that the electron is not identical to any ‘precisified’ 
version of it, rather than being indeterminate to which it is identical to. 
However, this consideration looses some strength when we consider that 
there could be a diﬀerence between fundamental entities and common 
objects with respect to the determinable-determinate distinction. 
Intuitively, an electron seems to be nothing more than the sum of very few 
properties. Once one of them is indeterminate, it is not clear what it mean 
to say that the electron is still something determinate. Let us assume that 
electrons are fundamental entities. An argument to the conclusion that, if a 
certain fundamental entity e has some indeterminate properties, then e 
itself is indeterminate, could be on the following lines. Suppose e possesses 
exactly 5 properties: color, shape, position, mass, and spin. Now also 
suppose that, for each of these 5 properties, the object could instantiate 
them only in 2 ways or degrees—the object can only be colored in 2 ways, 
can only be located in 2 diﬀerent places, can only have 2 diﬀerent shapes, 
and so on. Now suppose that e determinately possesses 4 out of 5 
properties, but it is indeterminate as to which determinate of the fifth 
determinable it instantiates. Say it is indeterminate in its color. Now one can 
imagine that, even though e possesses an indeterminate property, the object 
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itself is not a vague one. But suppose now, that instead of just one 
indeterminate property, e has 4 indeterminate properties out of 5, say only 
its shape is still determinate. Is the object still a determinate one? Although 
one could answer positively for the same reasons as before, it is also clear 
that doing so implies accepting a certain view of individuals as something 
over and above their properties. To strengthen this claim, we could after all 
even imagine that all the 5 properties are indeterminate. It seems that the 
account needs to presuppose a specific view of what individuals and 
properties are. If one thinks that individuals are nothing but the sum of 
their properties (as for the bundle view of properties), then the 
indeterminacy of some properties will entail in some cases indeterminacy 
of individuals as well. Although this is no problem per se, it is definitely one 
that requires a further analysis. 
 To conclude, I argued that the object-level approach to MI is not free     
from objections. However, as I have shown, it seems able to handle many of 
them, and furthermore it is certainly the best account for quantum 
indeterminacy.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Quantum Indeterminacy & Fundamentality 
3.1 Eliminativism on Quantum Indeterminacy            
As shown in the previous chapters, many have focused on quantum 
mechanics to provide motivations for developing an account of 
metaphysical indeterminacy. The most recent discussions, however, show 
that quantum indeterminacy has to be understood not in isolation, but 
rather by looking at its status in each of the main interpretations of the 
theory. David Glick (2018) has recently done so, and eventually argued that 
quantum indeterminacy ends up disappearing from the fundamental level, 
from which he concludes that it would be ‘eliminable’. In order to provide 
an extensive response to Glick’s eliminativism on QI, in this chapter I will 
be focusing on the relationship between MI and the topic of fundamentality. 
I shall start by showing that, according to the main views on the 
relationships between the derivative and the fundamental levels, inferring 
‘eliminable’ from ‘derivative’, as Glick does, is generally mistaken. However, 
there is a more charitable reading of Glick’s view on which I will be focusing 
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on. Roughly, the idea is that, despite not being eliminable, if quantum 
indeterminacy would turn out not be fundamental, it would not be 
metaphysical either. One way of doing so is by claiming that MI 
(independently from any consideration about quantum mechanics) cannot 
be a derivative phenomenon—a position famously defended by Elizabeth 
Barnes (2014). I will argue extensively that Barnes’ reasoning can be 
resisted. Finally, I will consider another way of defending the view of Glick 
and the likes, namely that of exploiting standard semantic or epistemic 
resources to account for derivative QI. My conclusion will be that quantum 
indeterminacy, though derivative, still is a mind-independent phenomenon, 
and thus, fundamental or not, it should still be taken as motivating an 
account of metaphysical indeterminacy.  
 Proponents of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI) have recently been     
focusing on quantum mechanics to motivative their view. Standard 
arguments for the existence of MI were mostly concerned with macroscopic 
phenomena, such as the vague boundaries of clouds and mountains. 
However, this kind of vagueness is notoriously hard to understand as 
metaphysical in character, and many semantic accounts are on oﬀer which 
seem to capture quite nicely what goes on in these cases—for instance, by 
insisting that the meaning of the words we use to refer to those macroscopic 
objects fail to determine their instances unambiguously. Since it does not 
seem to dependent on our language, quantum mechanical indeterminacy, 
also named ‘deep’ MI by Skow (2010), is considered to be of a special kind. 
On these lines, many have argued  that by establishing its existence we 33
would provide strong motivations in favor of MI. 
 David Glick (2018) has recently challenged the above line of reasoning.     
While previous attempts of arguing in favor of quantum indeterminacy 
were mostly focused on the general mathematical structure of the theory, 
 See footnote 7 above.33
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Glick invites us to look at the diﬀerent interpretations in order to establish 
what quantum indeterminacy really consists in. Glick considers the three 
main live interpretations of the theory—Everettian, Bohmian, and GRW—
and after a quick analysis (p.2), he concludes that in each of them, quantum 
indeterminacy disappears from the fundamental level, and therefore that it 
can be eliminated (p.3).  
If […] one took the properties to be ontologically derivative and quantum 
states to be fundamental, there would be little room for metaphysical 
indeterminacy […] any indeterminacy would occur at the non-fundamental 
level and hence may be viewed as eliminable. 
This chapter argues that Glick’s view, as it stands, is not tenable. As a start, 
in section (2) I will discuss Glick’s analysis of the status of indeterminacy in 
the three main realist interpretations of quantum mechanics. In section (3) 
I will then show that according to the main views on the relationships 
between the fundamental and the derivative levels of reality, the inference 
from ‘derivative’ to ‘eliminable’ is generally mistaken. In section (4), I 
propose a more charitable reading of Glick’s claim, according to which 
quantum indeterminacy, being merely derivative, is not metaphysical, and 
should not therefore be taken as motivating an account of MI. To 
strengthen such new reading of Glick’s view, in section (5) I will then 
consider an argument by Elizabeth Barnes (2014) to the conclusion that MI 
has to be fundamental, but eventually I will reject it in section (6). I will 
finally argue, in section (7), that Glick’s view does not go through, for the 
standard ways of understanding non-metaphysical indeterminacy are 
deeply unsatisfactory in the quantum mechanical case.  
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3.2  Is QI a derivative phenomenon?           
A striking feature of quantum mechanics, recognized since the very birth of 
the theory, is that it challenges the standard way of thinking about property 
attribution. When we think about objects instantiating properties, we are 
intuitively lead to assume that they always do so in a definite way. Quantum 
objects, instead, sometimes lack definite values for their properties. This 
feature, known as lack of value definiteness, is often taken to motivate MI. 
Here are, for instance, Calosi & Wilson (2018): 
[…] the property dependencies characteristic of quantum phenomena […] 
are present not just on the orthodox interpretation but also on (common 
understandings of) all the main non-orthodox interpretations conceiving of 
quantum indeterminacy in metaphysical terms. [p. 27] 
Since it depends on the very algebraic structure of quantum observables, 
according to Calosi & Wilson quantum indeterminacy (QI) is pervasive. 
However, as noted by Peter Lewis (2016), inter alia, we should not in 
general derive overall metaphysical conclusions from quantum mechanics, 
given the large disagreement between diﬀerent interpretations. 
Indeterminacy, as correctly claimed by Glick (2018), is no exception. Let us 
ask then, once the diﬀerent interpretations of the theory are taken into 
account, what must be said about quantum indeterminacy. Following the 
literature on this, as well as my own discussion in chapter 1, section 1.3, I 
will now consider only the three main realist interpretation of the theory.  
 Let us start by considering Spontaneous Collapse interpretations, and in     
particular GRW (from Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber, 1986). Recall that, in GRW, 
when a collapse occurs the wavefunction is multiplied by a narrow 
Gaussian function that has tails stretching to infinity in both sides. This 
means that collapses in GRW are never to completely definite states 
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(eigenstates), but only near ones. To solve this problem, known as tails 
problem, we find in the literature two main ways. To recap from the 
discussion in chapter 1: 
• GRW Link. The EEL is substituted with a weaker link, one that allows 
systems to possess definite values for their properties even if they are 
not in the corresponding eigenstate, but are only near one. Two ways: 
• GRW Fuzzy Link. (Albert & Loewer 1996) Fuzzy Link: A quantum 
system has a definite value v for a particular observable O iﬀ the 
square projection of its state into an eigenstate of O is greater than 
1 -P, for some (arbitrarily chosen) P.  
• GRW Vague Link. (Lewis 2016) Vague Link: A system has a 
determinate value for a given determinable to the extent that the 
square projection of its state onto an eigenstate of the corresponding 
operator is close to 1.  
• GRW Primitive Ontology. We provide an underlying ontology that is 
always determinate at every time, and we regard the residual 
indeterminacy only as derivative.  
• Two ways: GRW Mass Density (Ghirardi & al. 1995); 
• GRW Flash (Tumulka 2006a, 2006b). 
The conclusions I draw from considering the diﬀerent approaches on GRW 
with respect to quantum indeterminacy, are: (i) in link approaches, as also 
noticed by Lewis (2016), the indeterminacy is somehow fundamental; (ii) 
for the primitive ontology approaches, although there is some residual 
indeterminacy, it only concerns the derivative level of reality. At the 
fundamental level, both the flashes and the mass distribution are entirely 
determinate, as David Glick (2018) also maintains. Thus, given that it is safe 
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to claim that the primitive ontology approaches are nowadays the received 
view on GRW, Glick is correct in saying that the received view on GRW sees 
the indeterminacy as a derivative phenomenon. 
 Let us now turn to Bohmian mechanics. According to this interpretation,     
it is definitely true that the positions of the fundamental ontological items, 
say the particles, are always determinate (Bohm, 1951). And given that 
these are the only properties we directly observe, it follows that all the 
properties we directly observe are perfectly determinate. Therefore, 
indeterminacy in Bohmian mechanics turns out to be simply epistemic. We 
just do not know the precise values for all observables, but the fundamental 
ontology is made by particles that always possess determinate positions. 
However, this still leaves us with the issue of what we should think about 
properties that are, unlike position, not fundamental, as I was mentioning 
in the first chapter. Recall, for example, Peter Lewis (2016): « … although 
the Bohmian strategy arguably makes all the properties we directly observe 
[positions] determinate, it does not thereby make all properties determinate 
» (p. 101). Contrary to position, spin can have indefinite values in Bohmian 
mechanics. What should we say, from a metaphysical point of view, about 
the status of those derivative properties? Depending on the details of the 
diﬀerent takes on this particular interpretation of the theory, indeterminacy 
is either epistemic or, if metaphysical, only derivatively so. So, once again, 
Glick (2018) is correct in saying that Bohmian mechanics does not suggest 
fundamental indeterminacy.  
 Finally, let us consider Everettian interpretation (Everett, 1957). At first     
glance, the Everettian interpretation seems to avoid metaphysical 
indeterminacy by postulating the process of branching. Every branch seems 
free from indeterminacy. On a closer inspection, however, before 
decoherence is imposed on the quantum systems, indeterminacy is still 
present within each branch. The status of this residual indeterminacy is 
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highly problematic. Is it fundamental or derivative? Recent discussions on 
Everettian interpretation have focussed on a view known as wavefunction 
realism (Albert & Ney, 2013). According to it, what is the fundamental just 
is the multidimensional wavefunction, everything else supervenes on that. 
And the wavefunction does not contain or entail any metaphysical 
indeterminacy, or so it is argued. Even admitting that, on the derivative 
level, superposition states within each branch before decoherence cannot be 
eliminated, the fundamental ontology of Everettian QM does not include 
indeterminacy. Therefore, also here, Glick is correct that quantum 
indeterminacy is not a fundamental feature of reality. 
 As noted by Calosi & Wilson (manuscript), there also are ways of     
interpreting QM on which indeterminacy is fundamental . However, I 34
believe Glick is correct in establishing that the received views are those 
according to which QI is not fundamental. QI seems to appear, in many 
views on QM, only at some derivative level, emerging from the particles 
spatial distribution, the wavefunction, the mass density distribution (GRW-
Mass), or the distribution of the flashes (GRW-Flash).  
 The question before us now, is what kind of relation is there between the     
fundamental (fully determinate) level, and the derivative (sometimes 
indeterminate) quantum properties. In the next section I will briefly 
consider some possible options, and eventually conclude that none of them 
justifies the claim that the derivative level is eliminable.  
 The clearest example is ‘standard’ QM, that is extensively discussed by Glick (2018) as 34
well. However, Calosi & Wilson (ms) also considers ways of interpreting Bohmian, 
Everettian, and GRW, according to which the indeterminacy turns out to be fundamental, 
though they are not the received views. In response, Glick (ms) has recently pointed out 
that it might even be a desideratum for a physical theory that of avoiding fundamental 
indeterminacy. I shall notice  however, that in general imposing such metaphysical 
constraints on physical theories is a mistake. Furthermore, even if Glick were correct, 
perhaps what justifies the development of fundamental-indeterminacy free interpretations 
is precisely the lack of a coherent account of MI. Given that we now have many ways of 
developing such an account…
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3.3 Quantum Indeterminacy is not Eliminable            
How to spell out exactly what is the metaphysical relation at work in the 
cases just discussed is something that goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, a quick review of the main positions will be enough to show that 
inferring ‘eliminable’ from ‘derivative’, as Glick does, is generally erroneous. 
For reasons of space, I will only be considering what I take to be the three 
main notions that can be used in this context, namely reduction, 
emergence, and grounding .  35
 As a preliminary remark, I shall notice that, as regards to reduction and     
emergence, we can set aside a certain type of relation that is widely 
discussed in the literature, namely the inter-theoretic one. In the case at 
hand, it is obvious that we are not talking about reduction/emergence of 
one theory to the other, for both levels of discourse—the fundamental 
wavefunction and the derivative quantum properties—belongs to the very 
same theory, quantum mechanics . To argue for the contrary would be, to 36
say the least, highly revisionary of the way we think about what it means to 
provide an interpretation of quantum theory. So I will not consider these 
options, and instead focus only on the ontological way of spelling out the 
above relations, which I assume to be the correct one. 
 Ontological reduction can be of two types, eliminativist and conservative.     
The question to ask is whether we have any reasons to believe that the 
former type is apt to our case study. I do not think it is, as a quick review of 
the literature will show. Here are, for instance, van Riel and Van Gulick: 
 Calosi & Wilson (ms).35
 A similar point is made by Alyssa Ney (2013) when she discusses the reduction of 3d 36
space to the multidimensional wavefunction: « What I am most interested in here is the 
project of facilitating an ontological reduction. When I talk about ontological reductions, 
the contrast is with the classical notion of inter-theoretic reduction in the philosophy of 
science» (p. 173).
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Reductivists are generally realists about the reduced phenomena and their 
views are in that respect conservative. They are committed to the reality of 
the reducing base and thus to the reality of whatever reduces to that base. 
Though conservative realism is the norm, some reductionists take a more 
anti-realist view. In such cases the reducing phenomena are taken to replace 
the prior phenomena which are in turn eliminated […] The oxygen theory 
of combustion replaced the phlogiston theory and phlogiston was 
eliminated. Whether to count such eliminativist views as a variety of 
reduction is a matter of theoretical choice. Some might argue reduction 
entails realism about the reduced phenomena. If so, elimination is not 
reduction.  (2003) 
Even accepting that some reduction can be eliminativist—as perhaps it is in 
the case of phlogiston—the claim that the reduction of derivative quantum 
properties to the wavefunction is one of those cases lacks motivations. First, 
because contrary to the case of phlogiston, derivative quantum properties 
are not replaced by new properties. Second, because there also seems to be 
good reasons for being conservative reductionists in the QI case. A major 
problem faced by all those who are realist about the wavefunction is how we 
get to our ordinary 3-dimensional space, if all there is fundamentally to the 
world is the wavefunction living in a multidimensional space. 
Indeterminacy is no exception here, since the quantum properties that we 
usually take to be indeterminate—such as spin—only appear in the 3-
dimensional space. To solve this problem, Albert (1996) famously proposed 
an error theory according to which for the wavefunction realist, the 3-d 
space is nothing but an illusion. Accepting Albert’s view is perhaps one way 
to go for the eliminativist on QI. However, very few people today share this 
view, and many are trying to come up with a better story. If the 3d space is 
not entirely eliminated from our ontology, then neither are the properties 
that we find in it, along with their indeterminacy. 
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 Another idea that is usually associated with reduction, to which     
defenders of Glick’s claim could appeal to, is that of the possibility of a 
translation procedure. Once a reduction is successfully achieved, it should 
come with an in principle way of properly translating the objects of one 
level of discourse (the target of reduction) into those of the other level (the 
reductive base). In the quantum case this can easily be done by showing 
that every quantum property, whether indeterminate or not, corresponds to 
(can be translated into) properties of the wavefunction. Once again though, 
it is not clear why such translation procedure would imply any 
eliminativism. Translation procedures are clearly symmetric. In order to 
argue that one side of the reduction is ontologically privileged, we need 
further constraints. For instance, one way to provide such constraints can 
be seen in the Churchland (1986) style reduction of the mental to the 
physical . Churchland argues that purely qualitative mental properties are 37
problematic, and thus should be eliminated. However, she argues for this 
claim on independent ground, and it is unclear whether such independent 
grounds can be provided in the case of QI. To assume without independent 
ground that indeterminate properties are problematic is clearly question 
begging . 38
 Turning to emergence, I believe it is even more clear that Glick’s claim is     
too strong. Metaphysical emergence of new features or properties can be of 
two types, weak and strong, neither of which allows for eliminativism. The 
reason is, in both cases, that emergence is usually associated with two 
 I thank Jessica Wilson for suggesting this example.37
 Glick (ms) argues that such independent ground can be methodological, in that physical 38
theory should be such to avoid any reference to indeterminacy. As already noted in 
footnote 2, however, I am suspicious of any such strong metaphysical constraints on 
physics. After all, last century developments in physics have shown how damaging can be 
to assume too much metaphysics when interpreting physical theories. I believe that a good 
naturalistic attitude towards physics suggests we do not take determinacy as a desideratum 
as Glick suggests.
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components, synchronic dependence and ontological/causal autonomy (for 
an overview, see Wilson (forthcoming)). The latter component is crucial to 
see why eliminativism cannot be applied to emergence. No matter how is 
spelled out , autonomy cannot be understood if the emergent entities/39
properties are dispensable and eliminated from the ontology. 
 Let us finally consider grounding as a way to understand the     
relationships between derivative quantum properties and the fundamental 
wavefunction. Alyssa Ney (2013) is the most prominent example of such 
view. Nonetheless, as regards to Glick’s view, a few examples will suﬃce to 
show that grounding is generally introduced in contrast to eliminativism, 
rather than in accord with it. Fine (2001), for instance, explicitly introduces 
the notion of ground to provide a middle way between the realists and the 
skeptics about ontological dispute (p. 3). Schaﬀer (2009) is even more 
explicit, when he claims that «  [m]y sort of neo-Aristotelian will also be 
permissive about existence, in that she will not toss many candidate entities 
into the rubbish bin » (354), and « I am invoking the one and only sense of 
existence, and merely holding that very much exists » (360).  
 A lot more should be said about each of the options I have been quickly     
considering here. Nonetheless, the above is enough to show that there is in 
general no interesting sense in which derivative entails eliminable. As it 
stands, Glick's conclusion is simply mistaken, unless a reason is given to 
believe that standard ways of talking about the above notions should be 
revised when we talk about indeterminacy. Lacking such independent 
 Ways of understanding ontological autonomy for emergent entities include: 39
nomological supervenience (van Cleve 1990, inter alia), non-fundamental or fundamental 
novelty (Humphreys 1996, Wilson 2002, inter alia), non additivity (Bedau 1997, inter 
alia), multiple realizability (Aizawa & Gillet 2009, inter alia), symmetry breaking 
(Morrison 2012), elimination in degrees of freedom (Wilson 2010), in principle failure of 
deducibility (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948, inter alia), inter alia. For a discussion, see 
Wilson (forthcoming). None of the aforementioned characterization allows for 
eliminativism.
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reason, we shall conclude that eliminativism about derivative quantum 
properties should be rejected. 
3.4 QI: Derivative yet Metaphysical             
Although Glick’s position is untenable as it stands, there is perhaps a more 
charitable reading of his view in the vicinity that we might consider 
instead . The idea, roughly, is that although not eliminable tout court, QI is 40
eliminable qua metaphysical. By going this way, nothing need be added 
about the status of the derivative ontology, or about the nature of the 
relationships between fundamental and derivative levels. There still is 
indeterminacy in quantum mechanics, but the fact that it is not 
fundamental as we might have thought, implies that it is not metaphysical 
either. And, therefore, that it should not motivate accounts of MI. I will 
argue in this section that, also on this reading, Glick’s view is not as 
straightforward as it might seem.  
 In order to argue that derivative quantum indeterminacy is not     
metaphysical, two strategies seem available. The first strategy is to insist 
that, independently from QI, derivate MI is not consistent tout court. As I 
will show, proponents of this strategy might appeal to an argument, given 
by Elizabeth Barnes (2014), to the conclusion that MI has to be 
fundamental. The second strategy, instead, is to focus on QI only, and claim 
that it can in principle be explained as a mind-dependent phenomenon 
(either epistemically or linguistically). This can be achieved by showing that 
epistemic or semantic accounts of indeterminacy can be applied to 
quantum indeterminacy, provided it is merely derivative. Before 
 Glick (p.c.) also admits that this is the view he had in mind. 40
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considering each strategy though, a general worry needs be addressed. Thus 
far, in this chapter I have been talking about MI quite liberally and without 
specifying what it is meant by it. However, in order to better address 
whether MI can be merely derivative, and whether QI can be taken as non 
metaphysical, a few reminders about the diﬀerent approaches on MI are in 
order . 41
 In recent discussions, a consensus has been reached that two quite     
diﬀerent accounts of MI can be put forward. Jessica Wilson (2013) has 
named them meta-level and object-level approaches, and I will follow her on 
this. On the former approach, MI has to be understood as worldly 
unsettledness between fully precise options: there is MI when it is 
indeterminate which (determinate) state of aﬀairs obtains. On the latter, 
object-level approach, MI consists in the (determinate) obtainment of 
indeterminate state of aﬀairs. The first approach will generally be 
accompanied with a logic and semantic for the sentential indeterminacy 
operator, usually mimicking modal logic (Akiba 2004, Barnes & Williams 
2011). The second approach does without the operator, and instead will 
need certain further metaphysical assumptions concerning how to 
distinguish determinate states of aﬀairs from indeterminate ones. For 
instance, Wilson (2013) works on the assumption that determinable 
properties can be as fundamental as determinate properties, and then 
reduces MI to the obtainment of state of aﬀairs composed by objects 
instantiating determinable without unique determinate properties. Given 
the substantial diﬀerences between the two approaches, to avoid confusion I 
will discuss them separately from now on.  
 In his paper, Glick (2018) explicitly focuses on Calosi & Wilson (2018)     
approach to QI, which builds upon Wilson (2013) object-level approach. 
The  main reason for this, as I have argued in chapter 1, is that meta-level 
 For a more extensive discussion, see Chapter 1, section 4.41
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approaches might be ill suited to treat QI (Skow 2010, Darby 2010, Calosi & 
Wilson 2018, inter alia). However, I have also pointed out that many have 
been recently responding to this worry (Torza 2017, Darby & Pickup 2019, 
Fletcher & Taylor, ms), and it is fair to say that the debate looks pretty much 
open on this issue. I will therefore also consider the meta-level approach in 
what follows. 
 Let us start by asking whether, on an object-level approach on MI, merely     
derivative MI is consistent. Although Glick (2018) does not say explicitly, 
while introducing Calosi & Wilson’s (2018) account he writes the following: 
For one who adopts Wilson’s approach to metaphysical indeterminacy, this 
situation can be understood as a particle with the determinable position but 
lacking a (unique) determinate of position. If this is the correct 
understanding of QM, it follows that there is widespread indeterminacy at 
the fundamental level of reality. (p. 2) 
If we assume, for the sake of the arguments, that QM is a fundamental 
theory (as Glick does in a footnote), then Wilson’s approach would entail a 
‘widespread indeterminacy at the fundamental level’. This means that even 
if merely derivative MI might be consistent, according to Glick the 
quantum case is one in which the indeterminacy has to be fundamental for 
proponents of Wilson’s approach. I think, however, that Glick’s mistake here 
is to confuse fundamentality of theories with fundamentality of entities or 
facts. Even on the assumptions that (i) QM is a fundamental theory, and, 
crucially, that (ii) the fundamental entities are described only by 
fundamental theories, the argument does not go through. The reason is that 
(ii) leaves open (and rightly so!) the possibility for fundamental theories to 
also entail the existence of derivative entities. In order for Glick to argue 
that QI has to be fundamental, he needs to assume that, qua fundamental 
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theory, QM only describes fundamental entities. This assumption, however, 
is highly problematic and probably question begging.  
 Is there a better argument for the claim that MI has to be fundamental     
on an object-level approach? I do not think there is, since the very 
metaphysical structure of this view is silent about whether the 
indeterminate states of aﬀairs obtain at a derivative or at a fundamental 
level. It simply does not say. The confusion might arise from thinking that, 
for instance according to Wilson’s (2013) account, determinable properties 
are as fundamental as determinate properties. But the notion of 
fundamentality at work in this claim is a merely relative one. To make an 
example, to say that the determinable color is as fundamental as its 
determinates red or blue, is not to say that color is as fundamental as, say, 
spin or mass. On an object-level view, fundamentality does not enter into the 
definition of indeterminacy. For the indeterminacy to be fundamental on 
such view, we need to claim that the state of aﬀairs that are indeterminate 
are fundamental.  
 Turning to the meta-level approach, the situation changes radically, and     
looks more promising for those who share Glick’s intuition. First of all, 
because as argued by Barnes (2014), the meta-level approach needs to 
assume in their ideology an indeterminacy operator. Of course, having an 
operator per se does not mean having a primitive (just think of Lewis’ 
reduction of the modal operator). It is true, however, that according to 
Barnes & Williams (2011)—which is probably the most developed meta-
level account—indeterminacy is in fact a primitive notion. There is a sense 
in which, then, having indeterminacy as a primitive notion entails 
something about its being fundamental. The connection between 
primitiveness and fundamentality is a very intuitive one (see Benovsky 2013 
for discussions), and a detailed discussion of this issue goes beyond my aim 
here. Notice, however, that at least prima facie, there is a big diﬀerence 
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between saying that there is indeterminacy in our fundamental ontology, 
and saying that indeterminacy itself is fundamental (see Barnes 2014).  
 What is needed is an argument for the claim that if indeterminacy is in     
our ontology, then it is in the fundamental ontology. To my knowledge, the 
only such argument has been given by Elizabeth Barnes (2014), so it is 
worth spending some time on it. 
3.5 Barnes’ Argument Against Derivative MI            
Elizabeth Barnes (2014) has influentially argued for the following 
conditional claim: if there is any metaphysical indeterminacy, this must be 
at the fundamental level of reality. In a nutshell, Barnes’ argument relies on 
the following two principles: 
Bivalent Completeness (BC) — A complete description of a world w is 
a bivalent assignment of truth values to every sentence at w. 
Determinate Link (DET-L) — The determination link between more 
and less fundamental levels of reality is determinacy preserving. 
From these two principles, and assuming metaphysical indeterminacy at 
some derivative level of reality, but no indeterminacy at the fundamental 
level of reality, Barnes derives a contradiction, thus establishing the truth of 
the following conditional: 
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Fundamental Metaphysical Indeterminacy (FI) — If there is 
metaphysical indeterminacy, it cannot be only at the derivative level of 
reality (p. 341). 
Benjamin Eva (2018) has recently provided reasons to reject FI by 
challenging BC. Despite my agreement with Eva’s rejection of FI, I believe 
his reasoning fails. As I will show, however, a stronger case against Barnes’ 
conclusions can be found by focusing on DET-L. My conclusion will be that 
derivative metaphysical indeterminacy is consistent across a large part of 
the logical space. In this section I introduce the argument by Barnes (2014) 
in favor of FI, discusses Eva’s (2018) critique of BC, and suggests a way to 
resist it. In the next section I argue that, even granting BC, Barnes’ 
argument still does not go through, for  DET-L can be rejected.  
 Barnes (2014) starts her paper by inviting us to consider the following 
intuition about how fundamentality relates to indeterminacy:  
If the world really is indeterminate, then it must be in virtue of 
indeterminacy in fundamentals…if you’ve got determinate components and 
combine them in determinate ways, there’s nowhere for indeterminacy to 
come from. (p. 341) 
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If she is correct , then either there is no metaphysical indeterminacy at all, 42
or if there is any, it has to be fundamental . To argue for this view, Barnes 43
provides a reductio of the possibility of metaphysical indeterminacy only at 
the derivative level. Starting from the assumptions that there is 
indeterminacy in how the world is at the derivative level, but no 
indeterminacy in how the world is at the fundamental level, she derives a 
contradiction. Her argument runs as follows (f and d are variables ranging 
respectively over descriptions of the world at its fundamental and derivative 
level, while F and D are names of particular descriptions):  
1. For any complete true description of how things are fundamentally, 
f, and any complete description, d, of how things are derivatively, 
either f entails d or f is incompatible with d. (Assumption)  
2. Entailment is determinacy preserving. (Assumption)  
3. For some complete description, D, of a way for things to be 
derivatively, it is indeterminate whether D is true. (Assumption)  
4. For some complete description, F, of a way for things to be 
fundamentally, it is determinate that F is true. (Assumption)  
5. Either F entails D or F is incompatible with D. (From 1) 
6. If F entails D, and F is determinately true, then D is determinately 
true. (From 2) 
 I shall notice that, even at this stage, it is unclear how many people would actually agree 42
with Barnes’ way of expressing her intuition. To give an example, those sympathetic with 
Jonathan Schaﬀer’s monism (2010) would not grant the idea that ‘the fundamentals’ are 
the components which make everything else. As I shall make clear in this section, here as 
well as in many other passages, Barnes seems to make many unwarranted assumptions, 
both on fundamentality and on indeterminacy.
 In the paper I am considering here, Barnes does not argue for the consistency of 43
metaphysical indeterminacy, but simply assumes it in order to discuss whether it then has 
to be fundamental or not. In other works, however, she also argues for the view that 
metaphysical indeterminacy is consistent (2010, Barnes & Williams 2011). 
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7. If F is incompatible with D (i.e., F entails not-D), and F is 
determinately true, then not-D is determinately true. (From 2) 
8. Either D is determinately true or not-D is determinately true. 
(From 4, 5, 6 & 7) 
9. Contradiction. (From 3 & 8)  
The assumptions (1)-(4) lead to a contradiction, and therefore cannot be all 
true. Assumptions (1) contains the expression ‘complete true description’. 
Notice that—given the way in which Barnes uses the assumption for the 
argument—we could take this expression to be implicitly defined as BC 
above. Assumption (2), instead, is an instance of the principle DET-L. 
Finally, assumptions (3) and (4) taken together simply express the view, 
respectively, according to which there is metaphysical indeterminacy at 
some derivative level of reality, but no indeterminacy at the fundamental 
level. Thus, in order to maintain the consistency of metaphysical 
indeterminacy only at the derivative level, one has to reject at least one of 
premises (1) or (2). 
 Assumption (1), as Barnes has it, « is intended to be the unpacking of the 
thought that the fundamental facts fix the derivative » (2014, p. 342). A first 
remark to be made here concerns Barnes’ use of entailment in order to 
express the relationship between the fundamental and derivative levels of 
reality. Indeed, one could think that although the fundamental facts do 
indeed fix the derivative ones, this is not enough for the former to entail the 
latter. Perhaps, instead, a better way to express the idea behind (1) would be 
by appealing to the notion of grounding. Barnes quickly considers this 
option, and concludes that « … if the relationship between the fundamental 
and derivative—whether entailment or grounding or ‘in virtue of ’, and so 
forth—is determinacy preserving, the argument will still go 
through  » (2014, p. 342). Notice en passant, however, that taking into 
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account here the diﬀerent ways of defining what it is to be fundamental 
would require a much more detailed analysis . I will set this complication 44
aside for now, and shall assume that there is a way to cash out the relation 
between the fundamental and the derivative in (1) so as to come out correct 
for each all the main views on fundamentality. 
 Benjamin Eva (2018) has recently argued that premise (1) can be 
rejected. According to him, the completeness mentioned in (1) is 
ambiguous between BC and the following diﬀerent reading: 
Maximal Completeness (MC). A complete description of a world w is a 
full and consistent specification of which sentences are determinately 
true, which are determinately false, and which are indeterminate at w. 
While BC yields Barnes’ conclusions, MC does not. Eva then notices (p. 36) 
that assuming BC is question begging, for it would seemingly require a 
‘complete description’ to be entirely free from indeterminacy. As Eva has it:  
Clearly, this assumption is no longer justified once one countenances the 
possibility of metaphysical indeterminacy. Indeed, the claim that the world 
admits of metaphysical indeterminacy is itself equivalent to the claim that 
states of aﬀairs need not always be complete. (p. 37) 
 In fact, I am here convinced that Barnes assumes a certain account of fundamentality, 44
the so-called independence view of fundamentality—that is the idea that the fundamental 
is what is not dependent on anything else, and so it is ungrounded, or unbuilt (Bennet 
2017). This reading is also supported by her quick discussion on the possibility of 
substituting entailment with grounding. However, the independence account of 
fundamentality is not the only one on oﬀer, and a much more careful analysis is needed in 
order to establish a result like Barnes’ for each of the main views on what it is to be 
fundamental (such as, just to mention, the minimal complete basis view, the naturalness 
account, or the primitivist account). I take such analysis to be highly worth pursuing, 
though it goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Eva’s idea here, as I understand it, is that once we assume metaphysical 
indeterminacy (no matter at what level), we should not rule out MC as the 
correct way of cashing out what a ‘complete description’ amounts to. 
However—and putting the details of Eva’s discussion aside—we could 
wonder why Barnes cannot simply require to read the completeness in 
premise (1) as BC for fundamental level, yet granting MC for the derivative 
level. After all, she is explicitly assuming for the reductio that the 
fundamental level is completely determinate, which seems to actually 
suggest such a reading.   
 I shall stress that I do not mean to consider the above consideration 
conclusive. Rather, I only aim at suggesting that Eva’s critique might be 
resisted, and I take this as the main motivation for pursuing a diﬀerent 
strategy. My claim is that instead of questioning MC, we rather focus on 
DET-L and assumption (2) thereby. And I should also point out that Eva is 
explicit in granting Barnes’ defense of (2) (see, p. 34), which I take as 
further reasons to provide further analysis of it. 
3.6 The (In-)Determinate Link            
Premise (2) can be seen as an instance of the general principle DET-L, 
repeated below:  
Determinate Link (DET-L) — The determination link between more and 
less fundamental levels of reality is determinacy preserving. 
One could immediately wonder why requiring the link between what is 
fundamental and what is derivative to be ‘determinacy preserving’, given 
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that—for reasons that I already mentioned regarding premise (1)—after all 
we are in fact assuming the possibility of metaphysical indeterminacy. 
Perhaps, if there is metaphysical indeterminacy, it might turn out that its 
source lies precisely in the link between what is more and less fundamental. 
And, if so, there may be indeterminacy that emerges at some derivative 
level without it being inherited from the more fundamental level. Such a 
line of reasoning would straightforwardly deliver a way to reject Barnes’ 
argument, so let us see how it works in details.  
 In the presence of indeterminacy, the thought would go, one cannot infer 
‘Determinately q’ from ‘Determinately p’ and ‘p entails q’, for instead what is 
needed is ‘Determinately, p entails q’. In this way, however, the argument 
would be blocked by requiring the modification of premise (5) into the 
following: 
5*. Either F determinately entails D or F is determinately incompatible 
with D. 
(5*), contrary to (5), does not follow from (1), and can be rejected if we 
allow for the presence of some indeterminacy regarding which derivative 
facts are entailed by the fundamental ones. Barnes grants that much (2014, 
p. 343), but then considers the implications of allowing for such 
indeterminacy in the link between the fundamental and the derivative facts: 
…suppose the link between the fundamental and derivative can itself be 
indeterminate. If the facts about that link are themselves fundamental then 
this is simply another route to fundamental indeterminacy. If the 
fundamental facts entail the derivative ones but it’s indeterminate what 
derivative facts the fundamental facts entail then if the facts about what 
entails what are fundamental then there is indeterminacy in what 
fundamental facts obtain. So if the link between the fundamental and the 
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derivative is determinacy preserving, then there cannot be indeterminacy at 
all without there being indeterminacy in the fundamental facts. If the link is 
not determinacy preserving then that is because it itself can be a locus of 
indeterminacy. And so if the facts concerning the link are fundamental 
facts, then there is indeterminacy in the fundamental facts. (p. 343) 
Behind Barnes defense of premise (2) is the idea that the facts about the 
link between what is fundamental and what is derivative are themselves 
fundamental. As I mentioned, Eva agrees (2018, p. 34-35)—but why should 
we accept this? There is a growing literature regarding the issue of whether 
the facts about the link between what is fundamental and what is derivative 
are themselves fundamental. As a matter of fact, very few people share Eva 
and Barnes view on this, at least when the link is understood as a grounding 
relation. A quick survey of literature on this proves that Barnes’ assumption 
(2) is (at best) unjustified.  
 The question before us is the following: are the facts about the link 
between what is fundamental and what is derivative themselves 
fundamental? To address this issue, I will now focus on grounding. Recall 
that Barnes herself admits that the appeal to entailment in premise (2) 
might be a mistake, and that perhaps grounding would be a better notion to 
express the thought that fundamental facts fix the derivative facts. Be that 
as it may, it is quite clear that what she has in mind here is precisely a 
relation of determination and priority between facts. I myself believe that 
the appeal to entailment is misleading, but I will not argue for this and, for 
reasons of space and simplicity, I will simply assume that the discussion on 
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grounding can be properly translated into whatever Barnes has in mind, be 
that entailment, a building relation, ‘in virtue of ’, and so forth . 45
 While discussing whether the facts about the link are fundamental or 
not, Barnes also makes reference to a paper on this topic, namely Karen 
Bennett’s By Our Bootstraps (2011). Curiously enough, in this very same 
paper Bennett argues for the view the the facts about the link are not 
fundamental, contra what Barnes needs to assume for her argument to work 
(Barnes 2014, p. 343). However, there are also other options on the table on 
this issue, so let us quickly consider them. Three main views have been 
defended in the recent literature, which we can schematically group as 
follows: 
I. The facts about what grounds what are fundamental.  
II. The facts about what grounds what are derivative. 
III.The facts about what grounds what are neither fundamental nor 
derivative (Trialism). 
There are, of course, reasons in favor and against each of the above. As 
regards to (I), the main motivation is that if grounding facts are not 
fundamental, they would in turn be grounded in some other facts in a way 
that might seem to involve some vicious regress. As regards to why (II) 
should be preferred, diﬀerent views on fundamentality diﬀer. According to 
Ted Sider’s (2011) principle of purity, for instance, fundamental truths 
involve only fundamental notions. This principle clearly implies that facts 
 One might object her that this is too quick, and that entailment should rather be the 45
focus, for that is what Barnes uses after all. I shall stress, however, that an argument very 
close to the one I will provide using grounding can be given for entailment as well, by 
using the generalized version of a principle of purity. If, the idea is, the fundamental facts 
cannot contain any reference to non fundamental facts, then facts about what derivative 
facts are entailment by the fundamental facts are straightforwardly not fundamental. This 
is at least a possible view, and it is one that Barnes does not even take into account. 
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about what grounds what cannot be fundamental, for they make a reference 
to the non-fundamental level . As I mentioned, Karen Bennett (2011) 46
extensively argues in favor of (II), mainly by responding to the regress 
concern. Finally, in the recent discussion, option (III) is gaining a lot of 
consensus. The first to introduce this view is deRosset (2013), although he 
does not endorse it. We then find an extensive defense in Dasgupta’s (2016) 
distinction between facts that are apt and not apt for being grounded. On 
such view, the facts about what grounds what are not apt for being 
grounded, and so they are neither fundamental nor derivative.  
 Once again, it should be clear that I am not concerned here with 
assessing which of the above options is to be preferred. Rather, what is 
enough is to show that Barnes needs to assume (I) for her argument, and 
this is unjustified provided that Barnes does not provide an independent 
argument in support of it. 
 Thus, the defender of derivative indeterminacy can claim that facts 
about what grounds what are not fundamental, either because they are 
neither fundamental nor derivative (as for Dasgupta), or because they are 
derivative (as for Bennett, and Sider, inter alia). By doing so, she is able to 
claim that the fundamental level is free from indeterminacy, and that the 
derivative level can be indeterminate insofar as some facts about what 
grounds what are also indeterminate. 
 To conclude my analysis, I will now turn to a recent paper by Ryan 
Wasserman (2018), that could be taken as a way to characterize the idea 
that grounding facts can sometimes be indeterminate. Wasserman (2018) 
 Here I am using Bennett’s (2011) reading of Sider’s reasoning. However, once Sider’s 46
account is taken more seriously, the issue gets more complicated. In fact, Sider’s 
naturalness view on fundamentality is sub-propositional, which implies that we cannot 
even translate so straightforwardly the problem Bennett and I are discussing. I thank 
Claudio Calosi for making this point. On a separate note, see also Schaﬀer (2010) for a 
diﬀerent reasoning, based on free recombination, in order to defend (II).
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considers a view that, as he himself recognizes, though there is « much to 
say on its behalf », is « undeniably strange » (p. 66). Strange or not, I think 
the view can be useful to better understand how certain grounding facts can 
be indeterminate, as it is required by the modification of premise (2) I 
suggested in the previous section . According to Wasserman, we could 47
provide a novel theory of vagueness, and thereby solve the sorites paradox, 
by allowing for a metaphysical counterpart of the indeterministic laws of 
nature. The idea of an analogy between laws of nature and laws of 
metaphysics has been recently discussed by Kment (2014), Schaﬀer (2016), 
inter alia. The analogy is first suggested by the explanatory power of laws of 
nature, a feature that is also meant to characterize the laws of metaphysics. 
As Wasserman has it, the laws of metaphysics are « generalizations about 
what grounds what ». Now, we could be tempted to consider whether, as in 
the case of laws of nature, laws of metaphysics as well can be indeterministic. 
In a footnote, Schaﬀer (2016) considers this option, but immediately rejects 
it:  
Note that the restriction to the deterministic case is reasonable insofar as 
one wants a template for grounding, since ‘‘indeterministic grounding’’ 
seems impossible. Grounding seems to imply supervenience: fix the grounds 
and one fixes the grounded. The status of the grounded thus cannot be open 
to chance. By way of illustration, it seems impossible that, given a fixed 
physical ground, the biological status of the system remains open to chance. 
(p. 61) 
On the contrary, according to Wasserman allowing for indeterministic laws 
of metaphysics would help us solving the puzzles related to the notion of 
 I shall say in advance that a detailed discussion of such view would require a much 47
longer analysis, one that might be interesting for further developments.
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vagueness, and so deserves more consideration . Let us consider an 48
instance of the sorites paradox in order to see how this idea is supposed to 
work. Take a young man, Robert, who has at time t 1 billion hairs. We 
should agree that a man with 1 billion hairs is not bald, and thus: 
  
 1. Robert is not bald at t.  
Now suppose that at a later time t’ Robert starts loosing his hair at the rate 
of 1 hair per second, until he becomes completely bald. The sorites paradox 
can be formulated by adding the following, rather innocuous premise: 
 2. If Robert is not bald at t, then he is not bald at t + 1 second. 
By reiterating (2), we will paradoxically conclude: 
 3. Robert is not bald at t + 1 billion seconds. 
Standard responses to the sorites consist in denying the possibility of 
reiterating (2), and adding a cutting point where the reiteration is blocked—
a precise number of hairs after loosing which one becomes bald. 
Wasserman’s suggestion is instead to accept that there is no fact of the 
matter about what is the precise number of hairs that makes someone not 
bald—it is, in other words, metaphysically indeterminate when someone is 
bald and when is not, and it is so because the relevant law of metaphysics 
leaves this indeterminate. 
 Though in a diﬀerent context, also Emery (manuscript) contemplates the idea of 48
indeterministic grounding. However, as she does not develop this idea further, I will only 
consider Wasserman’s paper here.
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The basic idea behind the law-based theory is simple: Vagueness consists in 
indeterminacy in the laws of metaphysics. suppose that the fundamental 
facts, together with the laws, determine that a particular man has a 
thousand hairs on his head. In that case, we can suppose that the facts fail to 
determine whether or not the man is bald— in other words, the laws leave 
us with a borderline case of baldness. (2018, p. 76) 
According to Wasserman, the laws of metaphysics that are relevant for cases 
of vagueness are indeterminate. And recall that, as I mentioned above, such 
laws basically are generalizations about what grounds what. Therefore, a 
possible way to characterize how the link between more and less 
fundamental can be indeterminate is to allow for indeterminate laws of 
metaphysics.  
 Barnes’ argument against the possibility of derivative metaphysical 
indeterminacy relies on the principle that I called the Determinate Link. 
This principle, however, can be resisted in a context where we assume the 
possibility of metaphysical indeterminacy—be it derivative or not. Allowing 
for indeterminate grounding facts would not imply the impossibility of 
derivate metaphysical indeterminacy, as far as the facts about what grounds 
what are not fundamental. I have shown that according to many views on 
this topic, such facts are either derivative, or neither fundamental nor 
derivative (Trialism). Finally, having granted that facts about what entails 
what might not be fundamental, I have sketched a way, following 
Wasserman (2018), to allow for indeterminacy with respect to those facts. 
Thus, my conclusion is that Barnes’ (2014) argument against derivative 
metaphysical indeterminacy does not go through. 
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3.7 QI is not Semantic or Epistemic             
As I mentioned, there is a final strategy for those, like Glick, who wish to 
defend the view that QI is not metaphysical. The idea would consist in 
showing that standard epistemic or linguistic tools would suﬃce to account 
for QI, once we have established it being merely derivative (as we are 
assuming here). To see how this strategy could work, we first need to 
distinguish the two main approaches on QI—the meta- and object-level 
ones—and treat them separately.  
 Let us first consider the meta-level approach on MI. Elizabeth Barnes     
(2010) has provided the following counterfactual test (CT) that serves 
precisely as a tool for recognizing whether a sentence is MI or not: 
CT — Sentence S is metaphysically indeterminate iﬀ: were all 
representational content precisified, there is an admissible 
precisification of S such that according to that precisification the 
sentence would still be non-epistemically indeterminate. (Barnes, p. 
604) 
The main strength of this definition, as correctly noticed by Barnes herself, 
is that both the epistemicist (who thinks that all the indeterminacy can be 
explained as a lack of knowledge) and the semanticist (who thinks that all 
the indeterminacy can be explained as semantic indecision) will agree on 
the truth of the above counterfactual. Disagreement, if any, would arise 
when evaluating single sentences. Let us consider, then, what an evaluation 
of a sentence expressing QI would amount to in this setting.  
 Let us take the sentence S to express the proposition ⌜the electron e is     
spin-up in x⌝, and let us assume that e is in eigenstate of being spin-down 
in y, so that the spin component in x is indeterminate according to QM. We 
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can now suppose to run Barnes’ counterfactual test for S. First, we should 
imagine that the language in which S is expressed has all its content 
precisified. In this case, the obvious candidate for the content that needs to 
be precisified is that corresponding to the predicate ‘spin-up in x’. Clearly 
though, no matter how precise is the content corresponding to the predicate 
‘spin-up in x’, the indeterminacy at issue is not eliminated. In fact, the 
predicate is already fully precise and unambiguous. Think of a vague 
predicate, such as ‘bald’, to understand where the diﬀerence lies here. ‘Bald’ 
is a vague predicate because we can easily build a Sorite’s paradox with it. 
However, the precisificational strategy helps us avoiding the paradox. We 
can imagine an ideal language with a predicate for each number of hairs, 
instead of the predicate ‘bald’, and no paradox would arise. Even for such an 
ideal language though, the predicate corresponding to ‘spin-up in x’ is still 
perfectly precise. So the precisificational strategy is of no help here, and the 
sentence S is still indeterminate. To conclude the counterfactual test, we 
only need to add that such indeterminacy is not epistemic in character, as 
we already extensively discussed in chapter 1. Thus, sentences expressing QI 
(no matter whether fundamental or derivative) satisfy the counterfactual 
test for MI. 
 The counterfactual test just used, however, does not work for MI of the     
object-level kind. The reason is simply that, on this approach, sentences are 
not  the kind of things we believe are indeterminate. Quite the opposite, in 
fact. According to Wilson (2013), every sentence is perfectly determinate 
(and this is why there is no need for an indeterminacy operator on that 
approach), while some of them might express, or indicate an indeterminate 
state of aﬀairs. Thus, in this context the counterfactual test would be simply 
meaningless. Perhaps, what is needed is a sort of modified counterfactual 
test like the following: 
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CT-Modified — The state of aﬀairs expressed by a sentence S is 
metaphysically indeterminate iﬀ: were all representational content 
precisified, there is an admissible precisification of S such that 
according to that precisification the state of aﬀairs expressed by the 
sentence would still be non-epistemically indeterminate. 
According to the (CT-Modified), the precisificational strategy is still 
available for the semanticist (who can therefore accept the truth of it). 
Furthermore, the test leaves open the possibility of the resulting 
indeterminacy being epistemic (so that also the epistemicist would accept 
it). Nonetheless, this new test also allows for the possibility of an object-level 
reading of metaphysical indeterminacy. What the test says, is that if the 
content of the sentence cannot be further precisified, and if it is non-
epistemically indeterminate, then it has to be MI.  
 If we run this new test, however, we find that quantum indeterminacy of     
the object-level type would not be metaphysical. To see why, we can go back 
to the ideal language containing one predicate for each precisification. In the 
quantum mechanical case, the object-level approach could understand those 
predicates as each corresponding to a degree of instantiation (e.g. ‘50% spin-
up in x’). In other words, the idea is that if our language were powerful 
enough to possess a predicate for each degree, the indeterminacy would 
eventually disappear. Although this is allegedly the most powerful way of 
defending Glick’s view, I believe there at least two responses, which I will 
now consider in turn.  
 First of, we shall notice that the idea of having a predicate corresponding     
to each degree of instantiation is not as simple as it might first look. Recall 
that the degrees of instantiation in the quantum mechanical case map the 
real numbers, so that the language expressing them would need to posses 
infinite predicates. Secondly, and more importantly, the above strategy relies 
on an erroneous interpretation of how the object-level approach actually 
works. In fact, we have been assuming that a predicate like ‘x-spin’ behaves 
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precisely like predicates such as ‘bald’, while this is not what the approach 
tells us about quantum indeterminacy. In the ‘bald’-case, we can construct 
diﬀerent predicates corresponding to the possession of certain numbers of 
hairs. In the case of spin, instead, this is not clearly the case. The predicate 
spin has rather to be taken as incomplete, when without the degree of 
instantiation. In other words, the degree-theoretic approach to QI takes the 
predicate spin as a three place predicate. 
3.8 Conclusions            
In this chapter I have focused on the relationship between quantum 
indeterminacy and the topic of fundamentality. My main goal was to show 
that a certain objection to QI does not stand scrutiny. Although QI might 
not fundamental—as for the majority of the live interpretation of the theory
—pace Glick (2018), it still is a mind-independent phenomenon that 
escapes our attempts of regimenting it as due merely to our language or 
knowledge.  
 100
———————————       The Indeterminate Present       ——————————— 
CHAPTER 4 
The Indeterminate Present and  
the Open Future 
4.1  Introduction            
The relationship between contemporary physics and the philosophical 
debate on the open future are notoriously intricate. On the one hand, the 
theory of Relativity clearly imposes some constraints on our theorizing 
about the openness of the future. On the other hand, it is far less obvious 
what story quantum mechanics (QM) has to tell on this. On top of that, we 
all know how diﬃcult it is to come up with a satisfying theory that unifies 
both quantum and relativistic phenomena, a so-called quantum theory of 
gravity. Thus, as a matter of fact, both philosophers and physicists have 
looked at some features of QM in order to argue for the objective openness 
of the future, thereby claiming that Relativity might not have the last word 
on this issue. My first aim in this chapter is to show that these attempts to 
argue for openness via QM failed because they focussed on indeterminism, 
whereas the right phenomena to look at is the lack of determinacy suggested 
by quantum theory. Some of the main interpretations of QM are 
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fundamentally indeterministic—the evolution of quantum systems through 
time is such that two perfectly indistinguishable systems can evolve 
diﬀerently. Furthermore, such indeterminism is taken as an objective 
feature, in that it is totally independent from our epistemic limitations. 
However, plenty of philosophical arguments show that indeterminism fails 
as a suﬃcient condition for openness (see e.g. Pooley 2013). After having 
briefly evaluated these arguments, in this chapter I will suggest a way to 
provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for openness by focusing on 
metaphysical indeterminacy in QM.  
 Metaphysical explanations of the genuine openness of the future often     
appeal to objective indeterminacy. However, according to the received view 
on this issue, as I will show, such indeterminacy only pertains to future-
tensed state of aﬀairs that obtain at the present. I will here put forward a 
diﬀerent, original view on the relationship between metaphysical 
indeterminacy and openness of the future, which I shall call the strong 
indeterminate present to distinguish it from the received view, which I dub 
the weak indeterminate present. According to the approach I develop, 
unsettledness of future contingents is explained by the indeterminacy of 
certain relevant present-tensed state of aﬀairs. In order for an indeterminate 
present-tensed state of aﬀairs to explain the unsettledness of a future-tensed 
state of aﬀairs, there has to be a connection between the two. I will argue 
that this connection can only be provided if we look at the internal 
structure of the state of aﬀairs. I will then suggest that the best background 
theories to explain the connection are the so-called spontaneous collapse 
models of Quantum Mechanics, like GRW, which we already briefly met in 
chapter 1. 
 In section (2) and (3) I introduce the standard argument for openness      
based on indeterminism, show why it does not go through, and I then 
analyse the received view on the relationship between openness of the 
 102
———————————       The Indeterminate Present       ——————————— 
future and indeterminacy in reality, along with the notion of the weak 
indeterminate present (WIP) on which it is based. Section (4) gives the 
general outline of a theory of openness of the future based on the notion of 
the strong indeterminate present (SIP). In section (5), I focus on those 
features of the spontaneous collapse models of quantum mechanics that 
make them the best candidates for a background theory to explain the 
openness of the future in terms of SIP. Section (6) provides the theoretical 
framework for using spontaneous collapse models of QM as a theory for 
SIP. 
4.2  Openness, Indeterminism, Indeterminacy            
Among our ordinary intuitions about time, the idea of an asymmetry 
between past and future is perhaps the most pervasive, and yet a very 
mysterious one. We think at the past as fixed, no longer available to 
modification, and at the future as open, not yet settled. This pre-theoretical 
notion of openness is supported by a large number of phenomena. For 
instance, the openness intuition is somehow suggested by our sense of 
agency and by our feeling that we can influence the future while being 
impotent with respect to what happened in the past. Furthermore, we tend 
to think that the structural diﬀerences between memory and expectation as 
diﬀerent intentional states might be grounded on the openness of the 
future. The correctness of a memory report is linked to its past target in a 
way that expectation is not: in order for me to remember something the 
content of my memory has to represent correctly what happened in the 
past. Contrariwise, expectation does not require a determinate connection 
with the future, and expectation claims allows for a non-factive reading: in 
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order for me to expect that p will be the case, obviously I do not need to 
represent the future correctly as containing the truth of p. Finally, although 
philosophers have tried to explain the temporal asymmetry between past 
and future in terms of the asymmetry between cause and eﬀect (e.g., 
Reichenbach 1956), it is quite natural to think of the diﬀerence between the 
cause and the eﬀect as grounded in their diﬀerence in temporal location: 
eﬀects are less determinate because they are not yet there, when the cause is 
(see Miller 2005).  
 We all seem to agree that the notion of openness is somehow related to     
these phenomena. Disagreement comes when we try to provide a 
theoretical explanation of the notion. For instance, one could think that 
openness can be explained ontologically by certain theories of time. 
According to presentism (Tallant 2009a, 2009b, 2012, 2014 Tallant & 
Ingram 2018, Ingram 2016, 2018) and to the growing block view (Correia & 
Rosenkranz 2019), the future simply is not there, and that is the reason why 
it is open. Or we can think that openness is explained by there being a 
multiplicity of options and no fact of the matter at present with respect to 
which will be the actual one (Belnap et al. 2001). Other views seek an 
explanation of openness in the metaphysics of passage. If there is genuine 
becoming, then we can ground the asymmetry between fixity of the past 
and openness of the future on the directionality of flow. And we can do this 
within an eternalist framework as well, as with the moving spotlight views 
(Cameron 2015, Deasy 2015), or with theories according to which the 
present and future exist, but not the past ones (Casati & Torrengo 2011, 
Norton 2015).  
 Finally, and more importantly for our purpose, certain views try to look     
at the laws of physics for an answer. If laws of physics are fundamentally 
indeterministic—once again: as it is indeed maintained by certain 
interpretations of quantum mechanics—then perhaps openness is just a 
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result of the fact that nature does not determine or fix all the future facts 
(Le Poidevin 1991, 38). This approach in particular has been very common 
in the literature on the philosophy of quantum mechanics. Many physicists 
and philosophers in the past decades have argued, in one way or the other, 
that this theory supports the open future intuition, since some of the 
quantum mechanical laws (at least on some interpretation) are 
fundamentally stochastic. However, as argued by many scholars the above 
line of reasoning is not as straightforward as it might seem, at least for two 
reasons. First, as argued by Lewis (1986), and Markosian (1995), 
indeterministic laws would not just make the future open, but would make 
the past open as well, thereby in fact rejecting the asymmetry intuition. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, there is also the issue nicely 
summarized by Oliver Pooley (2013)  in the passage below: 49
Suppose that the laws of nature are indeterministic in the sense that 
specification of the world’s history up to a certain time, together with those 
laws, does not fix all future facts. To say that the future is open might only 
be to say that the future is not nomologically determined in this sense. But 
that the past and present, together with the laws, do not fix all future facts 
does not entail that there are no such facts. In tenseless terms, there can be a 
unique actual continuation of the world to the future of some time t, but this 
continuation need not be the only one compatible with the actual laws and 
the way the world is up to and including t. (p. 322) 
The mere fact that indeterministic laws of nature—together with all the 
facts about what is present and what is past—do not determine a unique 
future, does not mean that there is no such future. Whether or not the laws 
entail a unique future, from a metaphysical perspective there still remains 
 See also Torrengo (2013), Borghini & Torrengo (2013), for similar conclusions, though 49
with a focus on the the so-called thin red line view.
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the problem of the diﬀerent ontological status of the future with respect to 
the present and the past. 
 In order to assess whether QM supports the open future thesis, perhaps a     
better starting point would be to find what could be a minimal theoretical 
consensus on the notion of openness, one that is shared by everybody who 
participates in this debate. If the future is open, and the universe shows 
some qualitative diversity through time, contingent matters about the 
future are unsettled. Traditionally, this idea is captured by appealing to the 
notion of future contingents, that is future-tensed claims that are neither 
necessarily true (as “tomorrow either it will rain or it won’t” is) nor 
necessarily false (as “tomorrow both it will rain and it won’t” is). A mark or 
symptom of the openness of the future is thus that future contingents lack a 
(determinate) truth value. I take such a mark to be a crucial desiderata, and 
a sort of adequacy condition for any theory of openness, along the lines 
expressed by AC below. 
(AC) Assuming that there is some qualitative variation across time, 
future contingents are unsettled with respect to their truth value. 
In other words, we could assume that in order for a theory of the openness 
of the future to be adequate, it has to entail that the truth or falsity of 
propositions like <There will be a protest in front of Wall Street tomorrow> 
is not at present settled.  
 But what do I mean by unsettledness here, and what is precisely the link     
between unsettledness of future contingents and openness of the future? 
This question is particularly pressing since, after all, one could have a 
merely epistemic take on unsettledness, and claim that the only reason  why 
future contingents are unsettled is because we just do not know yet whether 
a certain proposition is true or false. However, if our aim is to characterize 
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the idea of the openness of the future as something not entirely due to our 
ignorance, clearly an epistemic take on the notion of unsettledness is 
uninteresting. If the future is open in a more robust and genuine sense, the 
unsettledness of future contingents have to be interpreted metaphysically, as 
an objective feature of the external world. That is to say, the world itself has 
to be unsettled with respect to the truth of future-tensed claims. What does 
an explanation of the temporal asymmetry in terms of a theory of 
metaphysical unsettledness of future contingents look like? And more 
generally, what sense, if any, can we make of the notion of metaphysical 
unsettledness?  
 The best way to think of unsettledness in a metaphysical way is by     
referring to the notion of indeterminacy, which appears to be more well 
regimented. This is a rather safe assumption, since notice that for those 
already committed to accepting metaphysical unsettledness, metaphysical 
indeterminacy would do no harm. The use of the notion of metaphysical 
indeterminacy just is the best way to spell out a prior commitment towards 
taking unsettledness in a robust way. Barnes & Cameron (2009), for 
instance, admit that the acceptance of metaphysical indeterminacy in order 
to defend the open future might be taken as a cost. However, they correctly 
rejoin that their proposal «  is concerned with someone who has already 
accepted the open future thesis [and is] therefore already committed to 
making sense of robust, non-representational indeterminacy 
(indeterminacy in how things are, rather than how they are described). In 
her case, she is committed to worldly indeterminacy concerning the 
future » (p. 304). Therefore, once we grant this, the openness of the future 
can be understood as a form of objective indeterminacy. More precisely, a 
natural idea is to think that a certain kind of objective indeterminacy of the 
future explains why future contingents are now unsettled. Thus, the order of 
explanation goes from an objectively indeterminate future to the 
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unsettledness of future-tensed claim when evaluated at an objectively 
determinate present. Future contingents are ‘oriented’ toward the future 
(their representational aims lie in the future), but are evaluated as unsettled 
in the present. What is unsettled is in the present (the truth value of future 
contingents, or the result of their evaluation), what is indeterminate is in 
the future (its openness), and future indeterminacy explains present 
unsettledness.  
 Notice, though, that indeterminacy of the future cannot mean that when     
the future arrives we will find that it is indeterminate. The indeterminacy of 
the future is resolved when the future becomes present. So, it seems prima 
facie contradictory to say that there is indeterminacy in the future, since the 
future is not indeterminate when it becomes present. Rather, the 
indeterminacy is in the future only until it does not arrive—it is from the 
point of view of the present, so to say, that the future lacks determination. 
Per se, the future is as determinate as the present.  
  To sum up. The unsettledness of future contingents is the mark of the    
openness of the future. Such a mark is explained by the indeterminacy of 
the future, which is however indeterminate only as of the present. The 
question before us is then the following: if the future is indeterminate only 
as of the present (because when the future arrives, it won’t be any longer 
indeterminate), does the openness of the future require also some form of 
indeterminacy in the present?  
 In what follows I will argue that according to what I call the received     
view, the present is indeterminate only in a weak sense, and I will thus dub 
this view the Weak Indeterminate Present (WIP). WIP is a weak form of 
indeterminacy of the present because no present-tensed states of aﬀairs are 
indeterminate on this view, nor it is indeterminate which present-tensed 
state of aﬀairs presently obtain. According to WIP, the openness of the 
future requires only a weak form of indeterminacy in the present, one 
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concerning only which future-tensed states of aﬀairs presently obtain. In the 
following sections, I will put this view in contrast with the view I call Strong 
Indeterminate Present (SIP), according to which the future is open because 
there is indeterminacy in certain present-tensed state of aﬀairs. The 
connection between the indeterminate states of aﬀairs in the present, and 
the indeterminacy of the future is given by the structural relations between 
the states of aﬀairs. Roughly, the present-tensed indeterminate state of 
aﬀairs are such that they can be “resolved” in more than one way in the 
future.  
 To give an example, we could think that the indeterminacy of <There will     
be a protest in front of Wall Street tomorrow> is grounded on the 
indeterminacy of some relevant present-tensed states of aﬀairs that obtain 
at present, such as the uncertainty among the members of the congress 
relative to the upcoming vote, and the swaying feelings of the protesters. 
The reason why there is such a connection is that protests in front of Wall 
Street usually require  a certain kind of motivation and attitudes. 
 In the next section I will provide a more careful analysis of WIP, before     
moving to my own approach in the rest of the chapter. 
      
          
4.3  The Locus of Indeterminacy in the Received View      
A future contingent is a proposition expressed by a claim about some future 
contingent matter. If now, in 2019, you utter the future-tensed sentence 
“There will be a space battle around Terok Nor in four hundred years”, you 
express a future contingent. In the standard analysis, the proposition 
expressed by your utterance is composed by a kernel present-tense 
proposition <There is a space battle around Terok Nor>, the future 
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sentential operator It will be the case that, and the metric determination 
(attached to the sentential operator) in four hundred years. In other words, 
by claiming that there will be a space battle around Terok Nor in four 
hundred years, I express the following proposition. 
SPACE-BATTLE: <It will be the case (in four hundred years) that there is a 
space battle around Terok Nor>.  
SPACE-BATTLE is clearly, in some sense, unsettled. For once, we do not know 
yet if it a battle around Terok Nor will take place in four hundred years or 
not. Besides, nobody would think that if SPACE-BATTLE is unsettled, then 
when four hundred years elapse, it is indeterminate whether a space battle 
is going on or not around Terok Nor. As already stressed, the future is not 
unsettled in this sense. Indeterminacy about the future is not indeterminacy 
in the future, for the indeterminacy will be resolved when the future arrives. 
Rather, everybody agrees that, if SPACE-BATTLE is unsettled, then it is now 
indeterminate what will be the case with respect to space battles around 
Terok Nor in four hundred years. Openness of the future requires 
indeterminacy of the future as of the present: the future is indeterminate as 
of now, not as of then. 
 Thus, openness of the future requires some form of indeterminacy in the     
present. However, in the received view, such indeterminacy does not 
require the present to be constituted by any indeterminate state of aﬀairs. 
We can introduce the notion of constitution as explained below. 
Constitution — A state of aﬀairs partially constitutes a time t if and 
only if it obtains at t and it is exclusively ‘about’ what is going on at 
t.  
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The notion of ‘being about’ is notoriously a vague one, but for our purposes 
suﬃce it to say that no future-tensed state of aﬀairs that obtain at the 
present time is about the present time; they are all about what will be the 
case at future times. Thus, no future tensed state of aﬀairs can constitute the 
present. 
 Since according to the received view the present is not constituted by     
indeterminate state of aﬀairs, the openness of the future does not require 
indeterminacy in presently obtaining present-tensed state of aﬀairs. Rather, 
the received view is that there is in the present indeterminacy with respect 
to future-tensed state of aﬀairs. More precisely, it is at present indeterminate 
which of two incompatible state of aﬀairs about a contingent course of 
event will take place. For instance, let us assume that time t’ comes four 
hundred years later than time t. At t, it is indeterminate whether the state of 
aﬀairs that [It will be the case in four hundred years that there is a space 
battle around Terok Nor] or the state of aﬀairs that [It will be the case in 
four hundred years that there is no space battle around Terok Nor] obtains. 
The indeterminacy, at t, as to which state of aﬀairs will obtain, explains why 
SPACE-BATTLE is in turn unsettled.   
 Now, assuming that time t is present, we can ask whether the     
indeterminacy as to which of the two state of aﬀairs obtain makes the 
present indeterminate in some robust sense? There are good reasons to 
answer negatively. In order for the present to be indeterminate in some 
robust sense, it has to be constituted by indeterminate state of aﬀairs, 
namely certain present-tensed state of aﬀairs have to be indeterminate, or 
there has to be indeterminacy with respect to which present-tensed state of 
aﬀairs obtain. Future-tensed state of aﬀairs « point beyond themselves », as 
Sider (2001) puts it. Whether they obtain or not in the present depends on 
what will be the case later on, and not—not entirely at least—on what is 
going on in the present. Thus, the indeterminacy concerning which future-
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tensed state of aﬀairs obtain at t in the case of the space battle is not due to 
indeterminacy in t. This suggests that according to the received view the 
locus of indeterminacy should be in the future of t. Yet, the future is 
indeterminate only insofar as it is still future: it is at present indeterminate 
what will be the case.  
 We can make more rigorous the notion of weak indeterminate present by     
appealing to two roles times can play in claims concerning the obtaining of 
state of aﬀairs, which we will refer to through the expressions “at t” and “as 
of t”, respectively. Intuitively, if a state of aﬀairs obtain at t then t is the 
temporal position of its obtainment, and if as of t* a state of aﬀairs obtain at 
t, t* contains “all that it takes” for the state of aﬀairs to obtain at t. We then 
take the first notion as a primitive that can be characterised as in (at t) 
below, while the second notion is explicitly defined in (as of t) below. 
(at t) If a state of aﬀairs F obtains/fails to obtain at t, then the 
proposition P that expresses F is true/false at t. If it is indeterminate 
whether F obtains at t, then P is unsettled at t.  
(as of t) As of t, a state of aﬀairs F obtains/fails to obtain/is such that it 
is indeterminate whether it obtains at t* if and only if the states of 
aﬀairs that constitute t entail/fail to entail/neither entail nor fail to 
entail that F obtains at t*. 
If, along with state of aﬀairs talk, we also allow for the notion of a state of 
aﬀairs’ internal negation, indeterminacy with respect to the obtainment of F 
can be construed as being indeterminate which of F and its internal 
negation not-F obtains. Thus, if it is unsettled whether there will be a space 
battle around Terok Nor in 400 years, it is undetermined which of the two 
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states of aﬀairs there will be a space battle around Terok Nor in 400 years 
and there will not be a space battle around Terok Nor in 400 years obtains.  
 A weak indeterminate present (WIP) is a time that is constituted only by     
determinate states of aﬀairs, but for which it is indeterminate which 
contingent future-tensed states of aﬀairs obtain, namely which between 
some future tensed states of aﬀairs and their internal negations obtain. By 
resorting to metrical tense operators (‘it willn be the case that’ to be read as 
‘it will be the case in n units of time that’), we can put it schematically as 
follows. 
WIP — a time t is a WIP iﬀ t is present, and as of t it is determinate 
which state of aﬀairs constitute t, and for some present tensed 
proposition φ and positive number n it is indeterminate which of 
the future-tense state of aﬀairs [it willn be the case that φ] or its 
internal negation [it willn be the case that not-φ] obtains at t. 
The received view explains the openness of the future via the weak 
indeterminate present. If it is unsettled whether there will be a battle 
around Terok Nor in four hundred years, then as of now, it is indeterminate 
whether the state of aﬀairs that [there is a space battle around Terok Nor] or 
the state of aﬀairs that [there is no space battle around Terok Nor] obtains 
in 2419. But when 2419 comes, it will no longer be indeterminate which 
state of aﬀairs obtain in 2419. More generally, for any time t, some time t* 
(with t* > t), some positive number n, and every proposition of the form <It 
will be the case that φ> (where φ is present tense, and does not contain 
hidden references to the future) that is unsettled at t: 
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 (i) As of t, it is indeterminate which of the two future-tensed state of    
aﬀairs [it will be the case that φ] and [it will be the case that not-φ] 
obtains at t. 
 (ii) As of t, it is indeterminate whether [φ] obtains or [not-φ] obtains at    
t*. 
 (iii) As of t*, it is determinate which between the two future-tensed    
state of aﬀairs [it will be the case that φ] and [it will be the case that 
not-φ] obtains at t. 
 (iv) As of t*, it is determinate whether [φ] obtains or [not-φ] obtains at    
t*. 
We can now pinpoint more precisely the received view as the thesis that the 
locus of indeterminacy is the future insofar as it is still future. The future is 
open because there is indeterminacy with respect to what future-tensed 
state of aﬀairs presently obtain, and such indeterminacy in the present is in 
turn (given that the present is otherwise constituted only by determinate 
state of aﬀairs) explained by the indeterminacy with respect to which 
“corresponding” present-tensed state of aﬀairs will obtain. More 
schematically, below.  
(Received View) The future is open if and only if for any times t and 
some time t* (with t*>t), and for some φ, (i) to (iv) holds, and (i) 
because (ii). 
For instance, assume that as of t, there is indeterminacy with respect to 
which future-tensed state of aﬀairs obtains at t, namely whether [it will be 
the case in four hundred years that there is a space battle around Terok 
Nor] or [it will be the case in four hundred years that there is no space 
battle around Terok Nor] obtain. The present time, thus, is indeterminate, 
 114
———————————       The Indeterminate Present       ——————————— 
but only because as of the present there is indeterminacy with respect to 
what state of aﬀairs constitute future times. But when the future times 
become present, the indeterminacy will be resolved: there is no 
indeterminacy as of at t* with respect to which one of the two (mutually 
exclusive) state of aﬀairs [there is a space battle around Terok Nor] and 
[there is no space battle around Terok Nor] obtains at t*. Finally, as we 
should expect, Received View complies with AC. Claims about future space 
battles are claims about contingent future matters. Given (as of t), if the 
contingent matter of a future space battle around Terok Nor in four 
hundred years is indeterminate—as the Received View entails—then it is at 
present unsettled whether it will occur. 
           
           
4.4  Weak versus Strong Indeterminate Present          
Although consistent, the received view is somewhat unstable. It explains the 
openness of the future in terms of the present being weakly indeterminate 
and the weak indeterminacy of the present in terms of the indeterminacy of 
the future relative to the present. One may think that this is how things 
should be: future times are open only until they are future. The locus of the 
indeterminacy that grounds the openness of the future can be neither in the 
present per se, nor in the future per se, but it must lie somewhere in the 
middle. I do not mean to provide any knock-down argument against such a 
train of thoughts. However, I believe that once we assume that the aim is to 
model a metaphysically robust idea of openness, the received view is 
unsatisfactory. Even if there is indeterminacy now with respect to which 
present-tensed state of aﬀairs will obtain, given that the indeterminacy will 
resolve, there is a mapping between the propositions that are unsettled as of 
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a time t—the future contingents—and certain corresponding state of aﬀairs 
that will be determinate when the future arrives. But then, what is it in 
reality that makes the relation between the present and the future the locus 
of indeterminacy, given that they are both constituted only by determinate 
state of aﬀairs? It is very tempting to reply that what makes the relation 
between the present and the future an indeterminate matter is just an 
epistemic factor. From the point of view of the present we can’t see precisely, 
as it were, what the future is like. In other words, one might think that if all 
the state of aﬀairs are determinate, both those in the present and those in 
the future, then the weak indeterminacy in the present could be explained 
away epistemically. 
 There are several reactions one can have to this criticism of the Received     
View, assuming it is on the right track. One can insist that if we take on 
board some further metaphysical assumption, such as the lack of existence 
of the future (cf. presentism or growing block), or a substantive notion of 
passage as a shift from the indeterminate to the determinate, the objection 
is blunted. As I have made clear, though, I am mostly interested in what is 
shared among many views about the openness of the future. Insofar as this 
rejoinder is based on auxiliary substantive thesis, which someone who 
accepts the Received View can reject (stick to the two examples above: a B-
theorist can accept neither), then I will simply just discard it.  
 Another reaction is to revise the Received View by inverting the order of     
explanation and claim that it is indeterminate what the future is like 
because the present is indeterminate, as in the Received View-revisited 
below. 
Received View-revisited — The future is open if and only if for any 
times t and some time t* (with t*>t), and for some φ, (i) to (iv) 
holds, and (ii) because (i). 
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If things stand as the Received View-revisited has them, the future can be 
said to be the locus of indeterminacy (to be indeterminate with respect to 
which present-tensed state of aﬀairs obtain) only in a derivative way, as a 
consequence of being indeterminate which future-tensed state of aﬀairs 
obtain in the present. An instability very similar to the one pointed out for 
the Received view shows up in the revised version too: the openness of the 
future is explained in terms of the present being weakly indeterminate, but 
the indetermination of the present concern only future-tensed state of 
aﬀairs. Indeed, the suspicion is that it may be historically indeterminate 
which one of the Received view and the Received view-revisited is the 
actual received view. But more to the point, insofar as the only notion of 
indeterminacy we have at our disposal is the WIP, the openness of the 
future looks very much like a brute fact. As of itself, no time is constituted 
by indeterminate state of aﬀairs, the indeterminacy of the future is only 
from the point of view of the present, and this relation between the present 
and the future—as suggested—is more naturally construed in epistemic 
terms, rather than as a feature of reality, given that both the present and the 
future, as of themselves are fully determined.  
 In this section, I will explore an alternative in which the indeterminacy     
of the future is explained in terms of a more robust idea of indeterminacy of 
the present. The hypothesis is that the present is partly constituted by state 
of aﬀairs that entail indeterminacy about the future. Those present state of 
aﬀairs ground the indeterminacy concerning the constitution of future 
times, and thus also the indeterminacy concerning which future-tensed 
state of aﬀairs obtains in at the present time. 
 Let us start by considering what strong indeterminacy in the present     
consists in. Recall from chapter 1 that in the debate on what is the best way 
to characterise metaphysical indeterminacy, the main divide is over 
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whether indeterminacy has to be captured at the level of state of aﬀairs—
which state of aﬀairs obtains, whether a certain state of aﬀairs or its 
negation obtains—or rather at the level of objects—as for objects failing to 
determinately instantiate properties. In the former case, it is sometimes 
indeterminate that a certain state of aﬀairs obtains, while in the latter it is 
always determinate whether or not a state of aﬀairs obtains, but sometimes 
an indeterminate state of aﬀairs (determinately) obtains. In the case of the 
weak indeterminate present, the indeterminacy as to which future state of 
aﬀairs obtains is clearly of the first type—it is indeterminacy as to which 
state of aﬀairs obtain. What about the strong indeterminate present? 
Although both options seem viable, I will assume here (for reasons 
presented in earlier chapters) that the latter approach is preferable. 
Indeterminacy of presently obtaining present-tensed state of aﬀairs is then 
to be understood as the obtainment of an indeterminate state of aﬀairs—
and not as whether a determinate state of aﬀairs or its internal negation 
obtains.  
 How are we to characterise an indeterminate state of aﬀairs? Although I     
will pass over some of the details here, it is useful to provide some 
characterisation. I will piggyback on Jessica Wilson’s (2013) account, 
already introduced in chapter three, to give an idea: 
Wilson-style Indeterminate State of Aﬀairs: a state of aﬀairs is 
(Wilson-style) indeterminate iﬀ a certain object instantiates a 
determinable property, but more than one determinate of that 
determinable. 
An indeterminate state of aﬀairs, on this view, occurs if the relationship 
between an object and its determinate and determinable properties is of a 
certain type. The account explicitly provides an explanation of metaphysical 
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indeterminacy by moving at the second-order. Although other features of 
the account are not relevant for the present discussion, this certainly is. In 
order to have an indeterminate state of aﬀairs occurring at the present 
(instead of having indeterminacy as to which state of aﬀairs occurs), we 
need to look at the structure of these state of aﬀairs—namely, we need to 
move to the second-order in some way. We can now provide a 
characterisation of the strong indeterminate present (SIP). 
  
SIP — a time t is a SIP iﬀ iﬀ t is present and t is constituted by at least 
one indeterminate state of aﬀairs. 
In order for SIP to provide an explanation of the unsettledness of future-
tensed propositions, it should comply with the following adequacy 
condition. 
(AC-SIP): for any times t and some time t* (with t*>t) and some φ, if t 
is a SIP, then as of t, it is indeterminate whether [φ] obtains or [not-
φ] obtains at t*, and it is so because of some indeterminate state of 
aﬀairs that constitutes t.  
Why should one think that robust metaphysical indeterminacy in the 
present can explain the indeterminacy that characterise the future? Think 
again of the example of the protest that I provided in the fist section. It is 
because the members of the Congress and the protesters have indeterminate 
mental contents that it is still open whether there will be a protest tomorrow 
or not. To simplify the example, consider Senator Bambo. At noon, he is 
still utterly undecided whether he will vote yes or no in the 18:00 voting. As 
of noon, it is thus undetermined  whether at 18:00 he will vote yes or no. 
The relevant state of aﬀairs about Senator Bambo that constitute noon here 
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can be thought of as composed by a determinable (being a mental state, or 
something like that) and more than one determinate of that determinate 
(intend to vote yes / intend to vote no). Those states of aﬀairs ground the 
present indeterminacy of the 18:00 voting with respect to Bambo’s behavior. 
Of course, the example does not cut much metaphysical ice, since the kind 
of indeterminacy at issue here is clearly mere representational 
indeterminacy (we do not need to posit an indeterminate reality in order to 
have indeterminate thoughts). What matters here is to give an idea of the 
structural connection between the indeterminate states of aﬀairs that 
constitute the present and the state of aﬀairs with respect to which the 
future is indeterminate.  
 In general, we can say that state of aﬀairs have as constituents individuals     
(s1,  s2, …) exemplifying properties. Those properties are determinable 
properties (D1, D2, …) , and each determinable property has its own 
corresponding pool of determinate properties (AD, BD, …). In order to allow 
for indeterminate state of aﬀairs as characterized above, we can introduce 
also complex properties, whose constituents are other properties. A 
complex property constituted by properties A and B, for instance, will be 
labelled A/B. Importantly, we also need to allow that some complex 
properties are composed by determinates of the same determinable. For 
instance, AD/BD is a complex property composed by two determinate 
properties of the determinable D. In line with Jessica Wilson’s idea 
introduced before, we can say that when a state of aﬀairs exemplify a 
determinable property D and some such complex property constituted only 
by D’s determinate property is an indeterminate state of aﬀairs. What 
interests us is to express the relation between a present state of aﬀairs [s, D, 
AD/BD] that is constituted by a system s, a determinable D, and some 
complex property AD/BD and the state of aﬀairs [s, D, AD] and [s, D, AD] 
concerning the same system s and determinable D, but only one of the 
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determinate property AD or BD. Such a relation can be expressed by the 
following two clauses. For any times t and some time t* (with t*>t) and 
some individual s, determinable D, and some of D’s determinate AD and BD: 
(1) As of t, an indeterminate state of aﬀairs [s, D, AD/BD] obtain at t.  
(2) As of t, it is indeterminate whether [s, D, AD] obtains or [s, D, BD] 
obtains at t*. 
(3) As of t*, it is determinate which between the two future tensed 
state of aﬀairs [it willn be the case that [s, D, AD]] and it willn be the 
case that [s, D, BD]] obtains at t. 
(4) As of t*, it is determinate whether [s, D, AD] obtains or [s, D, BD] 
obtains at t*. 
According to what I call the SIP-Openness view, the indeterminacy with 
respect to what state of aﬀairs constitute the future is explained in terms of 
a strong indeterminate present. 
(SIP-Openness) The future is open if and only if for any time t and 
some time t* (with t*>t) and some individual s, determinable D, and 
some of D’s determinate AD and BD: (1) and (2) holds, and (2) because 
(1). 
SIP-Openness compiles with AC-SIP. It is also easy to see how it can be 
used to account for the unsettledness of future contingents and so how it 
complies with AC too, once we accept the following plausible principle 
Link.  
(Link) If as of a time t there is indeterminacy with respect to which 
present-tensed state of aﬀairs F1,  F2, … obtain at a future time t*, then 
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as of t there is indeterminacy with respect to which future-tensed 
versions (it will be the case that F1, it will be the case F2, etc.) of the 
state of aﬀairs F1,  F2, … obtain at t. 
Given Link, SIP-Openness entails that if a time is a SIP, then it is also a WIP 
(as we should expect). Given (at t), SIP-Openness entails the unsettledness 
of the future contingents. Note, however, that by appealing to SIP-Openness 
rather than the Received view (or the Received view-revisited), we can 
bottom out the explanation of the unsettledness of the future contingent in 
a radical form of metaphysical indeterminacy. In so far as the instability of 
the received view with respect to the issue of the locus of the indeterminacy, 
and the suspicion of a hidden form of epistemic indeterminacy are to be 
avoided, SIP-Openness is preferable.  
 SIP-Openness tells us something about the internal structure of present     
indeterminate state of aﬀairs, and their connection with the structure of the 
state of aﬀairs for which it is indeterminate whether they will obtain or not. 
Of course, SIP-Openness does not tell us why indeterminate state of aﬀairs 
in the present can explain indeterminacy as of now of what state of aﬀairs 
will obtain, it just gives us an idea of the structural connection between 
those state of aﬀairs that is required by such an explanation. To answer this 
question we need to put more metaphysical flesh on the bones of SIP-
Openness, by introducing a background theory to tell us what s, D, AD, BD, 
and AD/BD are. 
 In the next section, I will introduce the basics of the spontaneous collapse     
approach to quantum mechanics, which will be then used, in section (6), as 
a background theory for SIP-Openness. 
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4.5 Objective Collapse Interpretation of QM           
The Spontaneous Collapse Models are a family of interpretations of 
Quantum Mechanics that were first introduced by Gian Carlo Ghirardi, 
Alberto Rimini, and Tullio Weber (GRW; 1986), building upon suggestions 
made by Pearl (1976), and Gisin (1983). As with all other interpretations of 
QM, such as the Bohmian (1952), or the Everettian (1956), the main reason 
why GRW was first formulated was to address the measurement problem of 
quantum mechanics. Roughly, this problem comes from the assumption 
that the standard (uninterpreted) formalism of QM is universally valid. A 
crucial feature of this formalism is that the temporal evolution of quantum 
systems is governed by the Schrödinger’s equation, which, among other 
features, is deterministic, and linear. The linearity of this equation allows 
the formalism to describe states of superposition. These states are practically 
impossible to visualize, and yet very easy to describe mathematically. To 
give an example, you can think of an electron e, and one of its properties 
(observables); for instance, its spin component along a certain axis. This 
property can be instantiated by the electron only in two ways: it can be 
either spin-up, or spin-down. When this happens, we say that the electron is 
in an eigenstate of the relevant observable (property), and we write e = |up> 
or e = |down>, respectively. Now, the linearity of the Schrödinger’s equation 
implies that, for every two solutions to the equation, the linear combination 
of them (their sum) is also a solution. Thus, we do not only have eigenstates, 
but also states of superposition of having, in the above example, both spin-
up and spin-down: e = |up> + |down>. These states are pervasive in QM, 
given the existence of incompatible observables—spin components in 
mutually orthogonal directions are a famous example. Whenever a 
quantum system is an eigenstate of a certain observable, it will always be in 
a superposition of the observable that is incompatible with the one in the 
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eigenstate. The measurement problem emerges from the simple 
consideration that, apparently, macroscopic objects are never in superposed 
states (cats are never both alive and dead at the same time). And therefore, 
as nicely summarized by Bell, « either the wavefunction, as given by the 
Schrödinger equation, is not everything, or it is not right » (1987).  
 The idea of the collapse of the wavefunction would solve the     
measurement problem simply by breaking the Schrödinger’s dynamics. 
According to von Neumann’s (1932) collapse postulate, the dynamics breaks 
whenever a measurement is performed. Therefore, there are two diﬀerent 
physical processes according to von Neumann: one is linear, deterministic, 
and described by the Schrödinger equation; and the other one is stochastic, 
and it is described by the collapse postulate. Almost everyone agrees today 
that this proposal is untenable, for it does not explain what a measurement 
is supposed to be, and for it is not clear why measurement should play such 
a crucial role.  
 In order to address these issues, GRW proposes a realistic collapse model     
that is very close in spirit to von Neumann’s proposal. However, instead of 
occurring through measurement, in GRW collapses occur spontaneously 
and are governed by a new law. This law is completely diﬀerent from 
Schrödinger’s equation: it is not linear, it is not deterministic, and it is not 
time reversal invariant. The collapse is explained by the assumption that 
every particles has a certain probability per unit time of undergoing a hit, 
and every hit makes the particle jump to a definite state. The wavefunction 
that describes the particle after a hit gets multiplied by a narrow Gaussian 
function stretched to infinity in both sides. The exact point on which the hit 
is localized within the Gaussian is determined randomly. However, given 
that we want to recover the statistics of standard QM, the probability 
distribution (within the Gaussian) is given by the square of the 
wavefunction amplitude before the hit, exactly as for the Born rule. 
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 Another crucial feature of objective collapse interpretations of QM is     
worth mentioning. It is usually assumed that collapses occurs in a preferred 
basis—in GRW, for instance, it is position. The requirement of a preferred 
basis is necessary insofar as one wants to take collapses as real physical 
processes. The choice of position is usually justified by the fact that 
macroscopic superposition states seem the least acceptable.  
 GRW model and the like seem a promising way to go in order to solve     
the main conceptual diﬃculties of QM. However, it also has some 
drawbacks. For instance, it has been argued that the introduction of a new 
dynamical law is ad hoc, or that the model has certain problems with 
dimensionality, and with locality (see Lewis 1997, 2003, 2006, 2013, 2016). 
It is not my aim here to address these issues, but there is one problem of 
GRW that is crucial for my arguments, so I will spend few words on it 
before moving to the next section. 
 Recall that, after collapse, the amplitude is not localized in a finite region,     
because the Gaussian function is stretched infinitely in all sides. This means 
that in GRW we never have collapses to position eigenstates, but only near 
eigenstates. This issue is known in the literature as the tails problem. If we 
require that a quantum object possess a determinate property if and only if 
it is in an eigenstate of the relevant observables (as with the Eigenstate-
Eigenvalue link introduced in chapter 1), it is easy to see how from GRW it 
would follow that objects never possess definite properties. In order to 
respond to this problem, proponents of GRW have tried to somehow relax 
EEL (Albert & Loewer 1996; Lewis 1995). For instance, one can admit that 
objects posses definite properties also when the relevant observable is near 
an eigenstate. This proposal is called the fuzzy link (Albert & Loewer, 1996; 
Clifton & Monton, 1999): 
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Fuzzy Link — A system has a determinate value for a given property 
iﬀ the squared projection of its state onto an eigenstate of the 
corresponding operator is greater than 1 - P, where the determinate 
value is the eigenvalue for that eigenstate.  
P is just a parameter that can be chosen as expressing what counts as 
definite. The bigger it is, the less the state needs to be close to eigenness in 
order to count as possessing the property. Notice that the fuzzy link is not 
fuzzy as to whether or not a property is instantiated, rather, it is explicitly 
fuzzy as to what is the border (the choice of P).  
 Or, instead of the fuzzy link, one can say that objects instantiate     
properties vaguely, and with degrees that corresponds to the relevant 
probability. This proposal has been recently put forward by Peter Lewis 
(2016): 
                
Vague Link — A system has a determinate value for a given property 
to the extent that the squared projection of its state onto an eigenstate 
of the corresponding operator is close to I, where the determinate 
value is the eigenvalue for that eigenstate.  
Here instantiation of properties does not come as all or nothing. For 
instance, my laptop instantiates the property of being on my desk now only 
to a certain degree, that can be calculated by considering the probabilities 
given by every Gaussian function associated with all the laptop’s and desk’s 
particles. And of course, whatever this probability is, it is enough close to 1 
to allow us to say, for all practical purposes (FAPP), that the laptop is 
definitely on the desk. 
 Each of the above proposals has drawbacks. As for the fuzzy link, what is     
allegedly the main problem is that it implies that properties sometimes 
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behave as if they are not instantiated as the link says. For instance, 
according to the fuzzy link, an object possessing the property of being on 
my desk can sometime behave as if it is on my carpet. Although this would 
happen with a very small probability, and for all practical purposes (FAPP) 
we can avoid countenancing this possibility, from a conceptual point of 
view this is highly problematic. The point is that it would imply the falsity 
of those theories according to which properties are individuated only by 
means of their dispositions. As for the vague link, it might seem odd to 
many to posit such a pervasive vagueness in the physical world. After all, 
from the vague link it follows that we are always wrong in attributing 
determinate properties to objects.  
 The tails problem is not only particularly pressing for anyone who     
attempts to interpret spontaneous collapse models as entailing metaphysical 
indeterminacy. It becomes even more pressing for those, like myself, who 
wish to provide a theory of openness based on such an interpretation of 
QM. In his recent book, Craig Callender (2017) seems to recognize this 
problem very well, although he does not talk directly about quantum 
indeterminacy. While in the business of rejecting the various attempts of 
arguing for the open future based on QM, Callender considers the 
possibility to argue that the superposition/eigenstate distinction maps 
directly the openness-of-future/fixity-of-the-past one. He then notices the 
following: 
[…] the symmetry of Hilbert space implies that we can write out our 
wavefunction in any of an indefinite number of bases, e.g., position, 
momentum, spin. A wavefunction that is a superposition in one basis may 
not be a superposition in another; for instance, the wavefunction of x-spin 
down is a superposition of up and down spins in the z-spin direction. Here a 
collapse to fixity in x-spin buys openness in z-spin. (2017, p. 95) 
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As he himself recognizes though, to this objection one can respond that in 
theories such as GRW, collapses always occurs in a preferred basis—as I 
said above, in the position one—and that we should only care about position 
superpositions states and eigenstates when we speak about the asymmetry 
between fixed past and open future. However, Callender immediately 
rejoins a second objection by reminding us that «  in any realistic collapse 
theory such as GRW one doesn’t get collapses onto eigenstates, but only 
near eigenstates » (2017, p. 95). Hence, even granting, by focusing only on 
position states, that there is a mapping between superposition/eigenstate and 
open/fixed, in GRW collapses are never to eigenstates, but only near ones. 
And without eigenstates, the thought goes, we will not end up having 
openness properly. This latter objection makes clear why the tails problem is 
particularly pressing.  
 Notice however, that Callender here seems to ignore the possibility of     
solving the tails problem. Although he might well be right that no solution 
to this problem is satisfactory, for dialectical reasons we need to say a lot 
more about why this is so. As far as I am concerned here, if the tails problem 
has no solution, then together with my proposal, the whole project of the 
spontaneous collapse models will not be a viable option. Therefore, I am 
perfectly happy to conditionalise the rest of what I say on the possibility 
that the tails problem can be solved. 
4.6  The Strong Indeterminate Present in QM           
In order for the SIP-Openness model to be true in our world, we need the 
underlying theory to meet two conditions. First, we need the theory to 
possess the resources to distinguish between determinate and 
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indeterminate state of aﬀairs, roughly in the way described in section (3) 
above, and to entail the existence of the latter. Second, the theory we are 
looking at has to provide instances of the schema given by SIP-Openness. In 
this last section, I argue that these conditions can be met if we interpret 
spontaneous collapse models of quantum mechanics as entailing quantum 
indeterminacy.  
 First though, let us recap some basics notions about quantum     
indeterminacy and the lack of value definiteness (LVD). We shall recall  that 
LVD is largely independent of how we interpret quantum mechanics, 
although diﬀerent interpretations will account for it diﬀerently. Let us 
consider once again the simple example introduced in chapter 1. If we 
know, say, that the electron e has spin-down on the x-axis (suppose because 
we measured it), we thereby also know that its spin on the other two axes 
cannot in principle be assigned. The then have the following states: 
 e = |↓x >         [1]     
 e = |↓x > = 1/√2|↓z > + 1/√2|↑z >     [2]      
 e = |↓x > = 1/√2|↓y > + 1/√2|↑y >     [3]     
Where [1] means that the electron is in an eigenstate of having the value 
‘down’ for the observable x-spin, and [2] and [3] express the empirical fact 
that being in an eigenstate of the observable x-spin implies being in a 
superposition of the observables that are incompatible with x-spin, namely 
y-spin and z-spin respectively. Since to every eigenstate there are some 
corresponding superposition states, LVD in quantum mechanics is 
pervasive. More generally, let us recall the so-called Eigenstate-Eigenvalue 
Link (EEL), already introduced in chapter 1:  
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(EEL) A quantum system s has a definite value v for the observable O iﬀ 
it is in an eigenstate of O having eigenvalue v.  
From EEL, we can derive that systems that are not in eigenstate of having 
value v for the corresponding properties, do not possess a definite value for 
those properties. This is, in a nutshell, LVD in quantum mechanics. And the 
interpretative issues that behind EEL and LVD are the main reasons for 
proposing an account of quantum indeterminacy in the first place.  
 Now using the Calosi & Wilson (2018) account of QI, through the EEL,     
we derive that: 
          
 1. e has the definite value ‘down’ for the property ‘x-spin’;     
 2. e does not have a definite value for the properties ‘y-spin’ and ‘z-spin’.     
Being instances of LVD, Calosi & Wilson (2018) suggest that we read the 
states corresponding to (2) as indeterminate SOAs. Take, for example, the 
state corresponding to ‘y-spin’. We have an individual, the electron e, a 
determinable, the observable corresponding to ‘y-spin’, and the determinate 
of that determinable, ‘down’ and ‘up’. Thus, at the time at which the state 
occurs, call it t, we have the following indeterminate SOA:  
 [e, ‘y-spin’, down’y-spin’/up’y-spin’]  [3]                                                                   
This can be easily generalized. Take a system s and one of its observables O, 
with distinct eigenstates |ψ > and |φ >. Any linear combination |ω > = a|ψ > 
+ b|φ > is a superposition. The resulting quantum state |ω > = a|ψ > + b|φ >, 
obtaining at a certain time t, is then to be interpreted as [s, O, ψO/φO].  
 Another major interpretative issue in quantum mechanics is that we do      
not directly experience superposition states like the above. Whenever we 
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perform measurements, the system we look at picks one of the superposed 
terms. In other words, after a measurement on y-spin, from [3] we get to 
one of the following: 
          
 [e, ‘y-spin’, down’y-spin’]        [4]     
          
 [e, ‘y-spin’, up’y-spin’]        [5]      
Explaining why and how this happens is, in large part, the business of 
providing an interpretation to quantum mechanics. The orthodox view, first 
formulated by von Neumann in 1932, is that measurements induce the 
wavefunction that describes the dynamical evolution of quantum systems to 
collapse into eigenstates, thereby eliminating superpositions. Of course, it is 
not my aim here to discuss which approach to quantum mechanics is to be 
preferred. Rather, I want to point out that if (a) we interpret LVD as Calosi 
& Wilson (2018) suggest, and if (b) we assume that the collapse of the 
wavefunction can be described satisfactorily, then quantum mechanics 
might be seen as a candidate underlying theory for a model like SIP-
Openness. As regards to (b), as I said in the previous section, it is no secret 
that von Neumann’s view on this issue has been criticized on many respects. 
Above all, the worry is that the notion of measurement is not well defined in 
theory. However, spontaneous collapse QM was introduced mainly in order 
to overcome such diﬃculties, and yet agreeing with von Neumann’s view 
about the idea that the linearity of dynamics has to supplemented with a 
non-linear component. 
 So let us see how in details how spontaneous collapse models can be used      
to model SIP-Openness. In the case of [4] and [5], the two clauses 
introduced in section (4) are met as follows.  
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1*) As of t, an indeterminate state of aﬀairs [e, ‘y-spin’, down’y-spin’/up‘y-
spin’] obtains at t. 
2*) As of t, it is indeterminate whether [e, ‘y-spin’, down’y-spin’] obtains 
or [e, ‘y-spin’, up‘y-spin’] at t*. 
Suppose a measurement occurs at t* and instantaneously collapses the 
wavefunction into one of the superposed terms. This means that, as of time 
t before the collapse, an indeterminate state of aﬀairs obtains (the 
superposition), and it is indeterminate which term of the superposition will 
obtain at t* after the collapse.  
 Recall now, that SIP-Openness is meant to provide an explanatory     
schema. It is not enough, then, that the two clauses are satisfied—we also 
need a motivation for believing that (2*) happens because (1*) does. My 
suggestion is that the notion of collapse does indeed play the required 
explanatory role. What is crucial here, is that collapse is an intrinsically 
temporal notion—we cannot make sense of collapse without distinguishing 
between the time before its occurrence, and the time afterwards. This idea is 
not a radically new one. Many physicists seem sympathetic with the view 
we are defending here, according to which the collapse mechanism is apt to 
explain openness (Lucas 1999, Christian 2001, Gisin manuscript). In fact, 
part of my goal in this chapter is precisely to clarify the metaphysics behind 
these intuitions. Here is, for instance, Lucas:  
There is a worldwide tide of actualization—collapse into eigenness—
constituting a preferred foliation by hyperplanes (not necessarily flat) of co-
presentness sweeping through the universe—a tide which determines an 
absolute present […] Quantum mechanics […] not only insists on the arrow 
being kept in time, but distinguishes a present as the boundary between an 
alterable future and an unalterable past (1999, 10).  
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And here is Nicholas Gisin:  
Admittedly, time is a complex notion, or series of notions with many facets, 
time may be relative, diﬃcult to grasp, etc. But time exists. Moreover, time 
passes. With spontaneous collapse theories, time exists and passes, the 
world out there exists and undergoes a stochastic evolution (manuscript, p. 
7). 
If we take the temporal component of collapse at face value, we shall 
conclude that what the notion does is to explain how physical systems 
change through time. It is natural, then, to take instances of (2*) as 
explained (at least in part) by instances of (1*): it is the fact that there is a 
superposition that explains why a collapse will occur. 
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Conclusions 
A diﬀerent metaphysical explanation of the openness of the future can be 
given by considering what I call the strong indeterminate present. I have 
given a precise characterization of how this model works, and how it 
explains the openness of the future. Finally, by looking at quantum 
mechanics, I have provided reasons to believe that this model might apply 
to our own world, if a certain interpretation of QM is the correct one. 
Standard metaphysical explanations of openness are usually silent about the 
physical description of the underlying phenomena. Openness understood 
in terms of the collapse of the wavefunction provides a radically new, 
naturalistic account of openness. This, I believe, is an interesting result per 
se. Whether or not a similar model is true of our world, crucially will 
depend on whether or not the underlying physical theory (upon which we 
conditionalise) is itself true or not. 
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